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Abstract
We are living in an unjust world where the majority of humanity is subject to unequal economic
and public policy systems that perpetuate cycles of poverty. Civil society, of which international
NGOs are major players, are acknowledging the need for systemic, transformational change,
which has to include meaningful participation in decision making processes by those whom are
most vulnerable.
In order to more effectively play this role, a number of international NGOs are moving decen-
tralised structures (often comprised of independent entities at country level) to legitimately
represent their primary constituents - those that are vulnerable, living in poverty, mostly in
the global South.
A consequence of this trajectory is added internal complexity and the creation of new man-
agement challenges, as decision making processes become more participatory and transparent.
In addition, this new reality of complex federal structures also requires that power inequities
between entities, are openly acknowledged and managed. Despite these challenges, this is a
non-negotiable journey for many international NGOs and they acknowledge the need to adapt
their management mechanisms to better handle this internal complexity.
First-hand experience sparked the interest to apply operational research and system dynamics
approaches to one such management mechanism, that of resource planning and allocation
within international NGOs. This study aims to develop a set of insights, based on the
system dynamics model, that could be useful to international NGO decision makers as they
respond to their “real life” resource allocation challenges.
Problem structuring methods are applied to these resource allocation challenges to gain a
deeper understanding of the core components of resource allocation in order to develop a
generic system dynamics model that simulates the necessary behaviours based on stakeholder
input. A set of management scenarios are developed and form the basis for conducting exper-
imental runs on the generic system dynamics model, testing different parameters in an effort
to compare quantitative results. These quantitative results are used to compare performance
against the original generic model, analysing trends and model behaviour to inform qualitative
recommendations and conclusions.
Key words: Resource Allocation, System Dynamics, Operational Research, International Non-
Government Organisations (NGOs), Problem Structuring, Management Systems, Simulation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
“Unprecedented efforts (to save the lives of millions and improved conditions for many more)
have resulted in profound achievements... (however) despite many successes, the poorest and
most vulnerable are being left behind.” [United Nations, 2015]
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has verified the up-
ward trend of combined foreign aid and official development assistance for quite some time
[OECD, 2016]. However, this increased financing, coupled with the first global development
framework, the Millennium Development Goals1, have displayed uneven, some say unsatisfac-
tory, results [UnitedNations, 2015].
The degree of success and root causes of the shortcomings of such efforts are diverse and
hotly contested but not the topic of this study. Rather, this reality illustrates the increasing
complexity of sustainable development challenges and how these are perpetuated by unequal
and discriminating policies and systems. This renders truth in the saying, “the road to hell is
paved with good intentions”: sometimes no amount of money, human resource and good will
can effect change without taking into account the holistic systems within which inequity and
injustice thrives.
Various development actors are responding to these systemic challenges with increased empha-
sis on lobbying, policy and campaign agendas together with their more traditional development
programmes. International NGOs are particularly well placed to influence such policy reform
agendas, as their multi-country presence and accountability to the vulnerable amplifies the
un/under-heard voices who historically get the raw end of the deal.
In order to play this role with increased legitimacy, some international NGOs are moving away
from their traditional, typically Northern-centric structures (funded by and head-quartered
in rich, developed countries) towards decentralised “federal” structures. Such decentralised
federations are often comprised of independent entities at country level (to legitimately rep-
resent their own constituents), supported by federation decision making processes that are
meaningfully participatory.
1It is premature to establsih the impact of their successors, the Sustainable Development Goals.
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A consequence of this trajectory is added internal complexity and the creation of new man-
agement challenges. As in reality, collective decision making, especially when it comes to
resourcing, can be lengthy and contentious, resulting in the adoption of complicated, cum-
bersome internal processes to increase participation and transparency. In addition, this new
reality of complex federal structures also requires that power inequities between entities, are
openly acknowledged and managed.
Despite these challenges, this is a non-negotiable journey for many international NGOs and
they acknowledge the need to adapt their management mechanisms to better handle this
internal complexity.
First-hand experience sparked the interest to apply operational research and system dynamics
approaches to one such management mechanism, that of resource planning and allocation
within international NGOs. The intention of this study is to investigate the extent to
which such a modelling process can generate insights for NGO management in relation to their
performance and effectiveness.
1.2 Purpose of the study
The desired outcome of this study is to develop a set of insights, based on the system dynamics
model, that could be useful to international NGO decision makers as they respond to their
“real life” resource allocation challenges.
In order to achieve this, this study aims to answer the following two research questions:
Number 1: Does the combined application of “soft” operational research and system dy-
namics result in reasonable representation of a generic resource allocation framework in model
form?
Number 2: Does this model yield interesting management insights for NGO management
that could help improve their own resource planning and allocation processes or decisions?
In addition, this study aims to provide some analysis and insight on the implications of different
management scenarios on select variables within the resource allocation model.
For the purposes of this study, we will focus on developing a model that is applicable for
international NGOs, that is NGOs with a global scope and reach, operating in a number of
different countries on focussing on a range of developmental and environmental issues. Specif-
ically, ActionAid International will be used as a detailed case study with additional insights
and comparisons with Greenpeace International, and to a lesser degree, Amnesty International
and Me´decins Sans Frontie`res (MSF) International.
2
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1.3 High level approach
A system dynamics approach was used to develop a model whose behaviour is representative
of the challenges faced by international NGOs with regards to resource allocation. Qualitative
descriptions of “real world” resource allocation challenges, understood through a series stake-
holder engagements with participating INGOs, were further refined using problem structuring
methods to gain a deeper understanding of the core components of resource allocation that
should be addressed in the model. These were then converted into level and rate equations
to establish a generic system dynamics model that simulates “real world” behaviour with a
sufficient degree of confidence. Although these were largely based on ActionAid International
experiences, critical commonalities were drawn across all participating international NGOs in
order to arrive at a more generic model that could potentially have wider relevance.
A set of management scenarios were then developed, drawn from a range of management, pol-
icy or external challenges that international NGOs typically encounter during the planning and
allocation of resources. These scenarios form the basis for conducting experimental runs on the
generic system dynamics model, testing different parameters in an effort to compare quantita-
tive results. These quantitative results were used to compare performance against the original
generic model, analysing trends and model behaviour to inform qualitative recommendations
and conclusions.
1.4 Dissertation structure
This dissertation is organised as follows:
Firstly, a brief background to this study is provided in Chapter 2. This includes an introduction
to Non Government Organisations (NGOs) and the development context in the 21st century
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2). ActionAid International and Greenpeace International are introduced
as two examples of international NGOs that have adopted decentralised structures, the NGO
profile that is of interest in this study (Section 2.4).
Chapter 3 further defines the focus of this study, justifying the choice of resource allocation
and the accompanying modelling approach, that of system dynamics (Section 3.3). Chapter 4
contains a literature review, with an emphasis on the application of system dynamics in similar
contexts (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) and the potential complementarity of operational research
techniques in the modelling process (Section 4.4).
In Chapter 5, the stakeholder engagement process is explained and the resulting manage-
ment descriptions of resource allocation are summarised based on their feedback (Section 5.2).
Problem structuring methods are applied to the management descriptions, using soft systems
methods (Section 5.4) and strategic options decision analysis (Section 5.5) to create a basis for
model development.
Chapter 6 introduces system dynamics as the overall modelling approach (Section 6.2) and
describes the resource allocation model that was developed using Vensim PLE (Sections 6.3)
including the model’s assumptions. Chapter 7 outlines the validation processes that were
applied to the model.
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Chapter 8 describes the management scenarios that are simulated and the impact of these
different scenarios on the performance of the model. The insights generated as a result of the
simulated scenarios are discussed in Chapter 9, as they relate to the initial research questions.
Finally, Chapter 10 concludes this study, highlighting insights, reflections and recommenda-
tions for future exploration.
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Chapter 2
Background to this Study
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and describes how these
organisations are evolving in response to the increasing complexity of development issues that
plague global society. The concept of decentralisation is explained in relation to an NGO’s
organisational structure, using ActionAid International as an example.
This chapter also explores the effect of decentralisation on a NGO’s resource allocation mech-
anism, the organisational mechanism of interest in this study. ActionAid International and
Greenpeace International are used as examples to compare the different characteristics and
challenges of resource allocation in decentralised NGOs.
2.2 The origin of NGOs
The United Nations coined the term, Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) after World War
I [Davies, 2016], however one of its earliest manifestations was the anti-slavery movement in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries [Davies, 2016]. This movement involved groups of people
across the globe fighting for a common cause - opposing the international slave trade. The
slave trade was eventually abolished by influencing national legislation and active campaigning
during international policy negotiations. Such activities are generally performed by today’s
NGOs.
In the 19th and 20th centuries, large scale international conflicts such as the World Wars
and others, required similar international interventions. Medical aid organisations such as the
International Foundation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and Save the Children were
established in the aftermath of World War I to attend to those suffering in countries on the
“losing end” of the war [Davies, 2016]. Just over two decades later, Oxfam and CARE were
founded to provide food relief after World War II. The list has grown exponentially ever since,
with NGOs’ popularity soaring in the 1970s and 1980s, delivering services to those in need and
advocating for the poor [Banks and Hulme, 2012].
5
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Today, depending on one’s chosen definition, the number of NGOs range from thousands of
established international NGOs to millions of smaller, national NGOs [Lewis, 2009]. Lewis
[2009] attributes this wide range to the lack of reliable statistics and the varied interpretation
of this three-lettered acronym.
For the purposes of this study, Vakil’s definition of an NGO as been adopted. Vakil Vakil
[1997] summarises such organisations as self-governing, private, not-for-profit, organisations
that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people.
2.3 The complexity of development
The UN-defined, universally-agreed Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were intended to
provide a set of common objectives to guide the international development community in its
effort to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by 2015 [UNDP]. The Millennium Development
Goals Report 2015 celebrated some of the MDG’s successes, specifically in relation to income,
primary education and healthcare. The report also recognises their limitations, critiquing their
development and implementation approaches and their uneven progress.
The Millennium Development Goals Report 2015 also mentions the drastic increase of devel-
opment aid over their 15 year period. Data indicates that official development assistance from
developed countries reached USD135.2 billion in 2014. However, Riddell [2010], in his 2010
article on re-thinking official aid, argues that “size doesn’t matter”. When one switches the
emphasis from individual dollars to the change realised per dollar, the resulting impact is not
as impressive.
The debate around the MDGs, and their newly formed successors, the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) reiterates the growing complexity of development with the world’s collective
problems showing no signs of submission. Figure 2.1 neatly captures this complexity, depicting
the traditional pillars of sustainability, developed by the UN, overlaid with multiple feedback
loops, reinforcing the interconnectedness of issues and decisions in these areas.
Figure 2.1: Three pillars of sustainability, adapted from the United Nations
Edwards and Sen [2000] summarises the major issues of climate change, migration and the
discriminating free market as this century’s world wars that will take many lives, mostly of
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those living on the edge of society. Edwards and Sen [2000] highlight the economic, social and
political forces benefiting the few and the power shift necessary in all three of these areas for
truly inclusive sustainable development. This is one of the many drivers prompting the NGO
sector to change, to better equip itself to respond to these interconnected issues in a more
integrated manner.
2.4 The changing role of NGOs
In addition to the complexity of the above development issues, disruptive technology, the role of
business in development and the rise of social movements all contribute to the need to re-invent
the traditional, rather bulky, international NGOs. Such NGOs are critiqued for their Northern
agendas and their inability to be nimble and agile in response to a fast changing society. In
2003, SustainAbility teamed up with the UN Compact and the UN Environment Programme
and produced a report called The 21st Century NGO: In the Market for Change [Beloe and
Elkington, 2003]. This report describes a new model for NGOs which remain critical actors in
civil society in the 21st century. In contrast to the earlier NGOs, this report articulates the
new model for NGOs as:
• Part of the system, fixing things from the inside
• Solutions-focused
• Growing through networks rather than growing from within
• Gaining supporters from like-minded individuals
• Multi-issue led with a stronger focus on transparency, governance and accountability
Banks and Hulme [2012], in their article, The role of NGOs and civil society in development
and poverty reduction, also urge NGOs to consider their declining legitimacy and encourages
closer alignment with their constituencies in communities as opposed to their donors. Banks
and Hulme [2012], agreeing with Edwards and Sen [2000], reiterates the political and social
exclusion that reinforces the cycle of poverty and that NGOs require a change in approach, in
addition to the structural changes as described by Beloe and Elkington [2003].
This change in approach requires a move away from service delivery, refocusing on organising
and supporting the empowerment of communities to effectively negotiate their own needs and
rights from the state [Banks and Hulme, 2012].
2.4.1 The decentralisation of NGOs
Over the years, many international NGOs have started to adopt the approach of rooted em-
powerment and mobilisation of communities. Some have also realised that a more decentralised
structure would increase their ability to build local support and also lessen the influence of
donor agendas [Elbers and Schulpen, 2014].
7
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND TO THIS STUDY
According to Fowler [1992], decentralisation in the context of international NGO management,
generally refers to an organisational structure where decisions are moved downwards and out-
wards, visualised in Figure 2.2. This allows for increased authority at a local level, as opposed
to head office level. This contributes to an international NGO’s legitimacy as decisions (some,
generally not all) are taken closer to communities rather than miles away in another country.
Although decentralisation can increase legitimacy, Fowler [1992] also describes the added com-
plexity and tension that it creates between the local country office and head office, especially
in relation to funding decisions. For example, a local country office, with its indigenous knowl-
edge, may know which project would have the most impact but the head office may feel the
decision is subjective due to local pressures [Fowler, 1992].
Figure 2.2: A simple illustration of centralisation versus decentralisation
The debate around decentralisation is ongoing with many arguing the advantages and disad-
vantages of adopting such a structure [Elbers and Schulpen, 2014]. This study refrains from
delving further in this debate. Rather, this study acknowledges that such a structure exists,
and can take on many forms [Fowler, 1992]. It is the effect of decentralisation on NGO man-
agement processes that is of particular interest and this is explored through the example of
ActionAid International.
ActionAid International: An example of a decentralised international NGO
ActionAid International is an early-adopter of decentralisation and continues to grapple with
the complexity that accompanies such a structure. ActionAid inspired this study and an
overview of the organisation and its decentralisation journey is described in the following text
box.
8
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ActionAid began fighting poverty in the 1970s as a UK-based, child sponsorship
charity. The organisation began with 88 individual supporters from the UK sponsoring
88 children’s schooling in India and Kenya. During the 1970s, ActionAid expanded into
Rwanda, Burundi and The Gambia. The organisation continued to focus on education
but was also involved with long term health and sanitation programmes, agriculture
and emergency response [ActionAid, a] whilst remaining focused on improving the lives
of the children that the organisation sponsored.
In the 1980s and 1990s, ActionAid continued to expand into new countries, moving
away from a service delivery approach to focus on tackling the structural causes of
poverty [ActionAid, a]. ActionAid began to work with whole communities, organ-
ising these communities to challenge injustice and demand their entitlements from
their governments. This became known as the Human Rights Based Approach
(HRBA) which “centres on active agency: supporting people living in poverty to
become conscious of their rights, organise and claim their rights and hold duty bearers
to account” [ActionAid, b].
In the 2000s, ActionAid continued to transform its approach and its organisa-
tional structure to fight structural causes of poverty. Even with its progressive HRBA
approach, ActionAid was still seen as a traditional UK charity “delivering” aid to the
South. It became increasingly evident that this type of an organisational structure
would not address the persistent poverty and inequality for those that ActionAid
strived to support [Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013]. As such, ActionAid decision
makers began the discussion of transformation into a decentralised federation. This
transformation would entail distributing power to its member countries, being more ac-
countable to the people communities within which they work, expanding and becoming
more legitimate in the South [Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013]. This discussion was
formalised in 2003 with the founding of ActionAid International [Jayawickrama and
Ebrahim, 2013], a federation.
Over the last decade, ActionAid continues to build its democratic and decentralised
federation with over 30 members working in 45 countries. A central International
Secretariat, practically and symbolically headquartered in Johannesburg, supports the
federation and serves the federal governance structures of the International Board and
General Assembly. This governance model has made ActionAid unique amongst its
peers although not it is not without its challenges. Improvements continue to help
clarify decision making principles in the federation, strengthen compliance and support
national general assemblies [Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013], without losing sight of
the primary purpose of this exercise - developing a more impactful organisation.
The Jayawickrama and Ebrahim [2013] account of ActionAid’s decentralisation journey is one
of the few detailed case studies and Elbers and Schulpen [2014] mention the need for more
empirical research on different NGOs transformations, beyond a theoretical narrative.
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2.4.2 Resource allocation in decentralised NGOs
As Fowler [1992] mentions, decentralisation adds tension and complexity in an organisation,
especially when it comes to funding decisions. As a result, many decentralised NGOs have had
to adopt a more formal mechanism to ensure that funding decisions are transparent, consistent
and adhere to the necessary policies that govern a decentralised NGO.
This study continues to use ActionAid as a working example and its resource allocation frame-
work is described below. Greenpeace International’s organisational profile is also introduced
and its resource allocation mechanism is discussed to provide a comparison for this study.
Please note that information regarding management processes such as resource allocation for
specific NGOs such as ActionAid and Greenpeace is limited. The below descriptions are an
interpretation based on interviews in 2016 with various managers in the two international
NGOs.
Resource allocation in ActionAid:
ActionAid created its first resource allocation framework in 2010 which was implemented in
2012. The purpose of the resource allocation framework was to provide ActionAid with a
transparent system for allocating financial resources in the interest of the common good of the
federation, aligning to the global mission and strategy. The framework consisted of a set of
policies that determined how financial resources were allocated between units within ActionAid
International and how the International Secretariat and the federation’s international work
were funded. This framework was governed by a set principles enabling the federation to
maximise its influence and impact, maximise income from supporters and donors and ensure
mutual accountability.
In 2016, ActionAid revised the resource allocation framework, building on its previous princi-
ples, ensuring it is “fit for purpose” in response to updated fundraising strategies and changing
external contexts.
A description of ActionAid’s current income: In 2016, ActionAid’s total income
was EUR229m, a 6% decrease from 2015, mostly due to exchange rate losses as a result
of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (Brexit). This is an example of an
over-reliance and susceptibility to the European economic climate [ActionAid, 2017].
This continues to be a driver for fundraising investments in new emerging markets in
order to diversify income [ActionAid, 2017]. ActionAid’s income is primarily restricted
with 65% of funds ”ear-marked”, pre-allocated prior to receipt [ActionAid, 2017].
ActionAid’s revised resource allocation framework aims to increase the predictability of in-
come and increase the funds to be pooled for collective allocation, prioritising certain amounts
for investments. The frameworks supports widespread collective contribution to reduce over-
dependencies in few markets and to facilitate the selection of a small number of global priorities
chosen from competing demands for funds..
Resource Allocation challenges:
As mentioned previously, most of ActionAid’s funds are generated in Europe which makes
ActionAid susceptible to European related financial crises, as was experienced with Brexit
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and, prior to that, the 2008 financial crisis [ActionAid, 2017]. This has increased the necessity
of any resource allocation mechanism to be robust against external shocks and have the ability
to be responsive to changing contexts.
Stakeholder interviews also revealed the challenges experienced in the implementation of re-
source allocation framework itself as a number of these related processes operate fairly sep-
arately. Efforts have been undertaken to synchronise these however balancing this to curb
complexity is key to ensuring that the processes remain manageable for smaller country of-
fices.
Finally, ActionAid’s income profile indicates that a large portion (65%) of income is restricted.
As the resource allocation mechanism is predominantly used to allocate unrestricted funds,
this limits the ability of the mechanism to fully achieve its goals.
In contrast to ActionAid, Greenpeace International’s income is largely unrestricted. There-
fore, exploring the organisational set up, resource allocation characteristics and challenges in
Greenpeace provides a useful comparison to understand potential similarities and differences
between these organisations.
Greenpeace International: A comparison
Greenpeace is a global campaigning organisation that works across 41 countries and is sup-
ported by 2.8 million supporters [Greenpeace]. It’s stated mission is to be “an independent
campaigning organisation, which uses non-violent, creative confrontation to expose global en-
vironmental problems, and to force the solutions which are essential to a green and peaceful
future.” [Greenpeace].
Greenpeace is comprised of independent regional and national offices as well as a central office
called Greenpeace International, all separate legal entities. The independence of these regional
and national offices are critical from a cross-liability perspective ensuring that actions from
one office cannot be held against another office in another country.
A description of Greenpeace’s current income: According to Greenpeace’s world-
wide financial statement published in their 2016 annual report, the organisation contin-
ues to grow with a total income in 2016 of EUR342m, an increase of 0.6% from 2015.
Over the past years Greenpeace has been susceptible to volatile exchange rates, espe-
cially that of the Euro, which affects the value of non-Euro-based equity held by other
Greenpeace organisations [Greenpeace, 2017].
Resource allocation in Greenpeace:
Of the 26 offices, approximately 20 contribute financially to the funding of the Greenpeace
head office. This contribution differs for each office and is based on the net fundraising income
of a given office. A proportion of prioritised funds is allocated to a set of priority countries
that are agreed upon every three years. These funds, known as block grants, are committed
with specific fundraising or campaigning targets in mind. The intention of these block grants
is to contribute to the establishment of national and/or regional offices so that each office has
adequate funds to make independent decisions and represent itself to the best of its ability
within the wider organisation.
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Greenpeace is experiencing income growth [Greenpeace, 2017] however some of this growth is
taking place in countries where it is difficult to extract funds based on certain legal requirements
in countries resulting in the “ear-marking” of global resources. Foreign exchange losses have
proven to be a challenge and any shortfall may results in internal projects being out on hold.
When de-prioritisation has to take place, it is always the objective to protect the Greenpeace
campaigns as much as possible.
In terms of reserves, each national or regional office as well as the centre hold reserves. All
the offices in Greenpeace adhere to a common reserves policy. If an office’s reserve level is
higher than the policy then the surplus is released for collective investment (over and above
the regular contribution). Greenpeace has a risk based reserves policy so reserves can be held
for a number of specified risk mitigations rather than having x number of months reserves.
Resource allocation challenges:
There are increased legal restrictions on outgoing funds (i.e. funds raised in one country to be
spent in another). This limits the ability for Greenpeace to allocate these funds flexibly across
the organisation. Some countries have stricter laws, limiting the movement of outgoing funds
to the purpose that the funds were initially raised (campaigns and associated overheads). The
growth of neo-liberalism also means that countries are increasing the restrictiveness of their
funds. Another challenge mentioned above is that of the fluctuations of exchange rates. A
variance at risk model is used to assist in planning however challenges are still encountered
due to the volatile nature of exchange rates.
2.5 Summary
The nature and complexity of development issues, the fast-changing environment and the
changing management structures of international NGOs provides many opportunities for the
application of Operational Research. This study focuses on the impact of decentralisation on
the resource allocation mechanisms in international NGOs and aims to investigate whether a
system dynamics model can reveal insights that could address the resource allocation challenges
that are experienced.
The following chapter translates this into a more detailed problem statement for investigation
in this study.
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Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
Initial interest in conducting this study stemmed from first-hand management exposure to
ActionAid’s existing resource allocation processes, the strategic drivers of financial allocation
decisions and the complexity of implementation within a decentralised organisational structure
and uncertain external environment. However, it soon became evident that other international
NGOs with similar structures and strategic intent deal with similar resource allocation pres-
sures.
In the previous chapter, resource allocation as a management mechanism was described, using
two international NGOs as examples. This chapter summarises the common management
challenges of such mechanisms, based on “real life” examples shared by different stakeholders.
It is important to reiterate that the purpose of this study is to use these “real life” examples
of resource allocation challenges to illustrate the application of a system dynamics modelling
process and how it can be used to generate insights for management decision making. This
study does not look to solve one particular challenge or optimise a specific system.
Operations research (OR) and system dynamics are introduced as the primary analytical ap-
proaches that this study utilises to generate these insights and recommendations.
3.2 Management challenges relating to resource allocation
Desk research, together with a handful of key informant interviews with finance, fundraising
and general managers within the international NGO sector, revealed a number of management
challenges in relation to resource planning and allocation. These summarised challenges provide
an initial flavour of the system that is modelled in this study.
It is important to note that the below are neither an exhaustive list nor applicable to every
international NGO, rather a handful of common challenges that are of interest from a system
dynamics modelling perspective in this study.
13
CHAPTER 3. PROBLEM DEFINITION
• Conflicting objectives: Resource allocation plays an important role in ensuring equi-
table distribution of financial resources across an NGO and ensuring that every member
has the ability to contribute in a meaningful way to the NGO’s global agenda.
Allocation principles, policies and objectives need to balance financial sustainability, the
organisation’s political identity and programme impact. These objectives often work
against each other therefore need to be prioritised and re-prioritised periodically to take
into account their wider operating context.
• Internal process complexity: Principles and policies that govern global allocation are
collectively agreed through various decision making forums within an international NGO.
However, translating these into implementable processes which can then be systematically
applied across a diversity of country contexts often requires cumbersome processes with
lengthy consultations to ensure sufficient transparency. Quantitative allocation rules need
to be robust enough to explain shortfalls or insufficient allocation whilst not undermining
wider confidence.
• External restrictions placed on funds: Generally, some form of restriction is placed
on funds received by international NGOs. These restrictions can relate to donor re-
quirements or government restrictions placed on outgoing funds in fundraising countries,
specifying to which location and/or activity funds can be allocated. Restrictions often
apply to overhead/operational costs such as administration, finance and IT making it
difficult to invest in internal organisational improvement initiatives, technology invest-
ments etc. It is crucial that allocation mechanisms can therefore take these restrictions,
or “ear-marking” of funds, into account when making strategic funding decisions.
• External uncertainty: Political and economic fluctuations in both donor and pro-
gramme countries can have a significant impact on the amount and type funds flowing
through resource allocation mechanisms. One such manifestation is foreign exchange in-
stability which has a direct effect on the movement of funds from one country to another
and should be considered as part of risk management. Economic climate can also have
an effect on the “charitable” behaviour of donors (whether individuals, organisations or
governments).
3.3 Justification of the approach
The analysis of a management mechanism such as resource allocation lends itself to opera-
tional research (OR) approaches. It deals with the allocation of limited resources, aims
to achieve some optimal allocation as described by a set of strategic objectives (sometimes
conflicting) and occupies an interesting management space intersecting both quantitative (fi-
nancial) and qualitative (strategic) decision making.
Given the “blurriness” and complexity of such mechanisms and the interface with various
decision makers, this study uses “soft” OR techniques [Forrester, 1994], such as problem struc-
turing, to better define the resource allocation “problem”, creating a common representation
based on the various stakeholder perspectives gathered throughout this study.
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This structured representation of the resource allocation mechanism is transformed into a
system dynamics model in order to simulate its behaviour. Different model variations
(management scenarios) are used to explore the effect of certain policy manipulations on the
“real-life” challenges that the stakeholders discussed. This creates an understanding of the
impact of recommendations and solutions on the whole system, taking into account the various
conflicting priorities and feedback loops.
A system dynamics approach is considered an appropriate modelling tool in this study for the
following reasons:
• A system dynamics model can take into account organisational learning through the
incorporation of feedback loops [Sterman, 2000]. This will enable the model to better
simulate effects of different policy parameters. This is particularly important in the NGO
environment where learning and accountability are important aspects, especially from a
programmatic perspective, ensuring that interventions are not doing more harm than
good. Regular review and reflection processes take place however the degree to which
the learnings from these are incorporated into future strategies and plans is debatable.
• System dynamics literature emphasises the impact of mental models, especially when
structuring a problem [Forrester, 1994] and [Sterman, 2000]. A mental model provides
an intuitive understanding of a system that one’s mind cannot comprehend in its entirety
[Sterman, 2000]. Sterman goes on to mention the extent to which such mental models
can influence the way feedback is incorporated into a system. This is particularly relevant
in a decentralised decision making structures, where representatives of constituents are
entrusted to make decisions that contribute to the larger global strategy beyond their
immediate management remit.
The above serves as initial motivation to investigate the application of a system dynamics
approach in modelling a generic resource allocation mechanism to explore how this approach
might generate learning and insights for NGO management.
The Literature Review, in the next chapter, introduces the system dynamics approach and
explores other system dynamics models and their application to development, management
strategy and resource allocation. Soft OR techniques are discussed in terms of the complemen-
tarity of application in the system dynamics process, offering tools to support the social/people
processes that interact with modelling and computer simulation processes.
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Chapter 4
Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
This literature review explores the application of system dynamics theory in similar manage-
ment or development contexts and discusses the findings and insights that would inform its
application to resource allocation. To the author’s knowledge, there seems to be limited litera-
ture focusing on modelling financial resource allocation in international NGOs. This provides
further motivation to undertake this study and, in doing so, contribute to the practical ap-
plication of system dynamics in international NGO management contexts. Having said this,
there is a wealth of literature on the application of system dynamics in the wider management,
economic, development and political arenas.
In this chapter, system dynamics as an approach is introduced, followed by its application
in various contexts. Three specific case studies are discussed, reflecting on the similarities
and differences of approaches in the development and/or social context. This chapter also
discusses the OR techniques that have been applied to resource allocation and the potential
complimentary of these techniques with system dynamics in the overall modelling process.
4.2 System dynamics application in development
4.2.1 An introduction to system dynamics
It is virtually impossible to start a system dynamics discussion without beginning with words
from the “founding father” himself, Jay Wright Forrester. Forrester has been instrumental in
this field from its inception in the mid-twentieth century [Forrester, 1989] and has shaped this
field of study with his thought-provoking insights and punchy challenges.
Forrester neatly recaps the birth and formative years of system dynamics in an article pub-
lished in the System Dynamics Review in 2007 [Forrester, 1989]. In his paper, Forrester [1989]
reminds audiences that system dynamics, similarly to OR, is a field responding to the prac-
tical, “real world” challenges that humans grapple with on a daily basis. The application of
system dynamics originally concentrated on engineering systems and, during the 1930s and
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1940s, was focused on military operational issues, experimenting with radar controls and more
sophisticated flight simulations during World War II [Forrester, 1989].
Since then, system dynamics has expanded its applications into management fields, economics
and public policy with computer modelling software improving alongside it [Forrester, 1989].
As system dynamics increased its reach and diversified its application, the variables that un-
derpinned these models also diversified. Soon models were dealing with abstract variables to
unpack, for example, the effect of management influence and leadership qualities on corporate
strategy [Forrester, 1989].
Important publications such as Urban Dynamics [Forrester, 1969] and, later World Dynamics
[Forrester, 1971] with its encore Limits to Growth, shone a spotlight on the field. These
publications critiqued ineffective, sometimes harmful, public policy and the impact of our
“bigger is better” mindset when it comes to consuming resources. These arguments continue
today, revived amidst the various climate change debates taking place [Meadows et al., 2004].
Following a fifty year “growth spurt”, Forrester believes that the system dynamics field has
plateaued in the 21st century. He attributes this to the fact that system dynamics has spread
itself widely without the adequate depth in expertise to effect real change as it relates to world’s
complex problems [Forrester, 1989], also highlighting the pressure of academia prioritising
journal articles over public relevance [Forrester, 1989].
In addition to this, the current system dynamics approach of taking a smallish issue, applying
system dynamics modelling and showing the results to the relevant decision makers is not an
optimal approach that results in large scale change [Forrester, 1989]. Forrester believes that
one must change the policies that govern the status quo to achieve fundamental societal change
[Forrester, 1989].
Policy change requires public support as well as decision makers as influencers. Forrester
reminds us that system dynamics is not simple and to exercise caution when oversimplifying
models. Complex problems may require complex solutions and Forrester urges practitioners to
focus on high-leverage policies, not to shy away from controversial results and to work towards
policy changes that are appropriate for implementation [Forrester, 1989].
4.2.2 System dynamics and development
System dynamics has been applied to countless real world situations in an effort to better
understand the nature of complex systems and the drivers of their behaviour. Khalid Saeed
led the expansion of system dynamics application into the development arena. He has spent
much of his academic and professional career modelling economic and policy development from
a systems perspective, covering diverse topics including income distribution, resource allocation
and political dynamics [Saeed, 1995].
Saeed’s contribution to the system dynamics discipline is widely recognised with his book
Towards Sustainable Development being awarded the prestigious Jay Wright Forrester award
in 1995. In this book Saeed presents a collection of models that analyse developing countries
social and economic systems [Saeed, 2016].
John Sterman mentions in the award citation, how the papers within Saeed’s book break the
boundaries of traditional disciplines. The models in his book include economic, political, social
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and resource implications on national policies, reflecting the integrated nature of such systems
[Saeed, 1995]. Sterman also commends these models for their ability to capture the dynamics,
disequilibriums, non-linearity and other elements of complexity. These elements are more
representative of the day to day fluctuations compounded by lingering effects on long-term
policy ineffectiveness [Saeed, 1995].
Arguably problems associated with sustainable development and challenges facing developing
countries can be seen as more important to solve (or at least better understand), as opposed to
modelling business systems set in highly developed countries. To some degree, this study will
be investigating the intersection of these management policies and practices, balancing inflows
of resources from mostly developed countries with the outflows, via programme interventions,
in developing countries.
Models from Saeed’s book, as well as others, are further discussed in the next section.
4.3 System dynamics case studies
This section discusses three case studies in order to provide insights into the current application
of system dynamics approaches to management strategy, policy design and resource allocation.
These case studies consider models both from a development perspective as well as from a
corporate perspective.
This discussion reflects on modelling assumptions, techniques and results and how these may
influence the development of the resource allocation model for this study.
4.3.1 Application of system dynamics to corporate strategy: an evolution
of issues and frameworks - Henry Birdseye Weil
Overview:
In this paper, Weil unpacks five areas that should be considered when applying system dynam-
ics to corporate strategy. Although these models are based on Forrester’s industrial dynamics
models, Weil incorporates organisational, physiological and social dynamics that heavily influ-
ence today’s corporate strategies and related decision making processes [Weil, 2007].
The five models discussed in Weil’s paper are based on his and other colleagues’ professional
experience and academic research. The first model describes conflicting management objectives
and the impact on organisational targets developed in the 1970s by Roberts. He then goes on
to discuss the behaviours of a Research and Development organisation as it balances decisions
regarding staffing, resource allocation and strategy. The third model that Weil discusses is
that of the long term commoditisation of goods and services driven by market dynamics [Weil,
2007]. Finally, Weil discusses the impact of technology adoption and innovation on strategy as
well as other social factors, such as an organisation’s brand, that impact strategy [Weil, 2007].
The first and final projects are more pertinent to this study and therefore are discussed in
more detail.
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Conflicting objectives model:
Weil describes the work of Roberts in the 1970s, whose paper, the Managerial Applications of
System Dynamics discusses the impact of conflicting performance objectives, most evident
in organisations with a prominent management hierarchy. Weil describes Roberts’ model
of manufacturing, distributing and selling goods, focusing on the flows of goods and cash.
Roberts’ model, illustrated in Figure 4.1 shows how management decisions based on mid term
information can result in a business failing to meet its targets [Weil, 2007].
This model illustrates the pressure to correct variances in projected income, sales and gross
margins: management feel pressure to act when variances arise, for example reducing prices to
increase sales. However, such remedial actions usually have a delayed impact. In the interim,
it could mean that gross margins are impacted and management may shift their attention to
correct this instead. The dotted lines in the figure represent the delayed effect of intermediate
management decisions to achieve one objective, whilst having an opposing effect on other
objectives [Weil, 2007].
Sterman in his book, Business Dynamics [Sterman, 2000], discusses the concept of the “mental
model” and how humans rely on these models, as simple constructs of more complex systems,
when making decisions. These models have limitations such as bias, judgement and imperfect
information. The more complex a system gets the more reliant one is on mental models which
often ignore, or are not able to take into account, feedback loops and delays in information
[Sterman, 2000].
Figure 4.1: Conflicting control loops model [Weil, 2007]
Dynamic Market Relationships:
Weil concludes his paper with a discussion on social factors such as brand, trust and trends
20
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW
etc. as key influencers in a dynamic market. Customers have abundant choices when it comes
to purchasing products and services and Weil acknowledge the influence that a powerful brand
has over customer choices [Weil, 2007].
In Figure 4.2, Weil proposes a simple value relationship model which illustrates the interaction
of a provider (organisation) and a customer. The provider adds value through personalisation
whilst the customer, feeling valued, responds with information that empowers the provider
[Weil, 2007]. Weil goes on to say that providers or organisations who have a good level of trust
with their customer base are better place to act on behalf of their customer [Weil, 2007].
Figure 4.2: Value relationship model [Weil, 2007]
In his current work, Weil is focusing on the modelling and analysis of social factors and cus-
tomer relationships as they relate to corporate strategy. He uses the example of Apple as an
organisation with incredible brand capability which, through its launch of products such as
the iPod, coupled with complementary products such as iTunes, has secured large amounts of
market share its sector [Weil, 2007].
Weil’s concluding remarks in his paper reiterate the fast-changing contexts within which today’s
organisations operate. Models are therefore required to incorporate new influences such as
social impacts, competitive advantage, technology and market evolution [Weil, 2007]. His
framing of business dynamics on three interrelated levels; organisation, market and context
[Weil, 2007] is of particular relevance in this study as resource allocation in international
NGOs also straddles the multiple levels of external contexts, and international and country
level application.
Considerations for this study:
The challenge of conflicting management objectives is not unique to the corporate sec-
tor. Even although Weil highlights conflicting objectives as being exacerbated by hierarchical
management structures typical in corporate organisation, the effect of such conflicts cannot be
ignored in the decentralised structure of an international NGO.
There are two features that present a challenge when considering performance objectives within
a decentralised structure. The first is the dual role of management, referred to within ActionAid
as “dual citizenship”. Dual citizenship requires a decision maker to consider the organisation
actions from an individual country office perspective as well as from a global organisational
perspective. This becomes more challenging when developing global strategies, which requires
general consensus from country office decision makers who are primarily accountable to their
national constituencies.
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The challenge of conflicting objectives is probably more pertinent in resource allocation deci-
sions. Although fundraising trends are changing, it is generally the case that funds are raised in
high-income, typically Northern countries and are allocated to programme initiatives in lower-
income, typically Southern countries. Country office decision makers would understandably
prioritise country specific objectives and initiatives over regional or global campaigns and this
prioritisation would also be reflected in resource decisions. However, such decisions may not
always culminate in the optimal allocation from a global organisational perspective. For this
reason a specific decision making group may be designated to consider allocation from a global
perspective, and consider what is best for the sustainability and impact of the organisation as
a whole. The tension of dual citizenship is an important consideration for this study as are
the learnings from Weil’s case study, as this effect is incorporated into the resource allocation
model.
Although in the non-profit sector, international NGOs are still competing amongst each other
for funds and supporters. Accountability, effectiveness and impact are increasingly important
for an NGO’s “competitive advantage”. For an international NGO such as Greenpeace, which
generates most of its funds from individual givers, the brand and value relationship with
its supporters is critical.
Greenpeace has exceptional brand power in the environmental sector with its edgy campaigning
techniques and quick adoption of technology in terms of communication, tapping into social
networks and digital campaigning as well as having popular, well-known brand ambassadors.
Greenpeace individual supporters have little say over the exact allocation of their donations.
This differs from ActionAid’s child sponsorship fundraising model, where a certain percentage
of funds is pre-determined based on the location of the sponsored child. Using Weil’s argument,
one might infer that this degree of flexibility in funding allocation is afforded to Greenpeace
by a fairly satisfied supporter base.
This study will not fully explore the value relationship and brand impact, however supporter
engagement and satisfaction are important drivers, linking effective execution of a strategy (as
a proxy for achieving impact) to an international NGO’s propensity to fundraise. This requires
a more in-depth discussion around international NGO brand and funding strategies which is
not the focus of this study.
4.3.2 Public policy and rural poverty - a system dynamics analysis of a
social change effort in Pakistan - Khalid Saeed
Overview:
This paper was written in the 1980s, a time when developing countries were grappling with
structural adjustment policies driven by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
These types of structural adjustment and traditional development policies have received heavy
critique over the years, some saying such policies further exacerbated cycles of poverty rather
than providing any alleviation [Saeed, 2016]. Decades later, global poverty and inequality
remain enormous threats and, coupled with environmental repercussions of a consumer society,
are the topics for debate within development, public policy and economic sectors [Saeed, 2016].
In this paper, Khalid Saeed discusses public policy approaches and unpacks reasons for their
ineffectiveness in alleviating rural poverty, utilising the Pakistan case as the basis for his
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analysis [Saeed, 2016]. Saeed uses the analysis of this model and the results of this study to
argue the importance of incorporating economic factors in policy frameworks to yield better
results in relation to redistribution and income equality [Saeed, 2016].
The points that Saeed make in this paper, some three decades ago, are not dissimilar to those
found in the recently published book, The Great Divide [Stiglitz, 2015]. In this book, world
renowned economist and Nobel prize winner, Joseph E. Stiglitz, echoes the need for a revised
policy regime of “equalising” economic and fiscal policies. Policies that would be able to reverse
the cumulative, unjust effects of previous policy decisions that have left the world in the state
it is today [Stiglitz, 2015].
Income distribution model outline:
Saeed uses an agrarian income distribution model of the developing country, Pakistan, as the
basis upon which to apply different policy frameworks to understand their effectiveness in al-
leviating rural poverty [Saeed, 2016]. Saeed’s decision to focus on rural income distribution
is reflective of the inability of Pakistan’s development policies, focussed mostly on rural pro-
ductivity and social issues, to affect change on rural household income [Saeed, 2016]. Saeed
considers the following core aspects within his model:
• Land management sectors: This is a “dualist” economy consisting of a capitalist
sector hiring wage farmers and/or leasing land and an entrepreneurial sector of self-
employed peasant/subsistence farmers.
• Land ownership: The tenure system governs land ownership and protects the rights of
land owners. Resources, such as land, are allocated on the basis of the financial ability
of each sector (capitalist and self-employed) [Saeed, 2016]. Land owned by each sector
changes as the two sectors buy and sell land between themselves. The same applies to
the flow of capital between the two sectors.
• Worker compensation/wage income: The workforce is split between wage employ-
ment and self-employment. Income is both consumed and unconsumed in each sector,
with the unconsumed “savings” used to purchase land or capital and, therefore, eventu-
ally consumed as well [Saeed, 2016].
The above flows of resources and income streams are governed by the economic decisions made
by each sector and are incorporated as feedback loops which drive the behaviour of this in-
come distribution model [Saeed, 2016]. Saeed provides a visual of these positive and negative
feedback loops impacting the wage rate in two simplified causal diagrams in Figure 4.3. In this
model, the wage rate is primarily driven by the ownership of resources by workers, represent-
ing their bargaining power. The effect of the negative (balancing) and positive (reinforcing)
feedback loops can be described with the following illustrative examples:
• Negative feedback loops: The ownership of resources by workers is influenced posi-
tively by the workers’ propensity to purchase and save. At the same time, this is neg-
atively impacted by the capitalists’ propensity to purchase and save. All other things
being equal, a higher wage rate would result in less job offers and a reduction of wage
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workers. Higher numbers in the self-employment sector would reduce collective work-
ers’ propensity to save as self-employment sector requires more capital. The eroding of
workers’ ownership of resources and their bargaining power would ultimately drive down
their wage rate.
• Positive feedback loops: Capitalists have the option to not hire workers and rent out
their land (referred to as sharecropping) to cultivators. These incoming rental payments
strengthen the financial position of the capitalist sector. As mentioned earlier, the sector
with a better financial position has an increased ability to own more land. This is
reinforced by the fact that the more land that is owned by the capital sector, means
that the rental is driven up due to the higher demand by the cultivators. This increases
the financial ability of the capitalist sector and therefore reinforces the decrease in land
ownership by the peasant farmers/cultivators [Saeed, 2016].
Figure 4.3: Wage rate causal-loop diagrams [Saeed, 2016]
Effects on public policy decisions:
Saeed describes, in detail, the many public policies that were implemented to alleviate rural
poverty in Pakistan during the latter half of the 20th century. These policies ranged from
rural extension services to provision for agricultural technology, rural credit and promotion of
rural collectivism through the formation of cooperatives and land reform [Saeed, 2016]. These
policies were all aimed at increasing income of those living in poverty in the rural areas [Saeed,
2016]. Saeed applies these aforementioned public policies to the system dynamics model and
simulates their effect on the income distribution system. Unsurprisingly, they fall short of their
desired objectives.
For example, Saeed’s simulations show that agricultural technology on both a small and large
scale increase productivity comparably between capitalist and worker sectors, therefore land
management and ownership patterns remain the same and income concentration in the capi-
talist sector persists [Saeed, 2016]. Similarly, radical land reform policies made some difference
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at the start of the simulations, but eventually, land reverted to the capitalist sector which has
the greater propensity to intensify productivity with modern farming techniques and fewer
workers.
Considerations for this study:
The results of Saeed’s simulations and policy analysis bring to light important considerations
for this study, specifically as it aims to identify policy recommendations for implementation of
an effective resource allocation framework.
Growth and equity represent core objectives of both the public policies in the case of Pak-
istan as well as objectives for a decentralised international NGO’s resource allocation frame-
work. In the case of Saeed’s income distribution system, two sectors were identified (capitalist
and worker/cultivator) both wanting to increase land ownership whilst maximising their re-
spective consumption [Saeed, 2016]. The system that Saeed modelled, left to its own devices,
results in an unequal distribution of income and resources which requires effective policy in-
tervention for sustainable redistribution. In the case of decentralised international NGOs,
although member countries have equal voting rights, the financial concentration remains un-
equal and financial redistribution through a resource allocation framework is required.
Saeed’s observations with regards to the realities policy implementation is also relevant
to this study. Saeed highlights the importance of considering the interactions of different
policy interventions and also the unintended results that could counteract the desired objec-
tives. This is especially prevalent in decentralised management structures where implementing
a central/standardised policies or mechanisms such as resource allocation will have different
implications in different country offices as they operate as independent entities in such a fed-
eration.
Saeed’s concluding remarks include a set of suggested policies that would better enable growth
and equity in the rural sector. Saeed, rather than producing radically different policies, rec-
ommends smaller amendments within the bounds of existing interventions, i.e. improving
implementation of land reform, rental taxes, migration policies. In principle, this may be bet-
ter received by decision makers who are invested in and/or responsible for the creation of the
previous, less effective, policies.
4.3.3 Implementing performance based programme budgeting: A system
dynamics perspective - Grizzle and Pettijohn
Overview:
In this paper, Grizzle and Pettijohn explore performance based programme budgeting (PB2)
and propose a system dynamics model to unpack longer term influences, opportunities and
challenges of such a policy implementation using the state of Florida’s experience as an illus-
trative example [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
According to Grizzle and Pettijohn, “Performance-based program budgeting requires govern-
ment spending to be classified by program; programs must have missions and objectives; and
input, output and outcome measures must be linked to these missions and to appropriation
levels. Programs commit to achieving a specified level of performance for each output and
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outcome in exchange for specified level of funding.” [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002] Further to
this, incentives and penalties may be applied to programmes who achieve or fall short of their
performance objectives.
A system dynamics approach is employed to model this reform and to capture the non-linearity
and long term feedback loops that are inherent in such systems. It also provides a better
understanding of the behaviour of a system and the degree to which different variables influence
the overall success of the system over time [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
Model outline:
Grizzle and Pettijohn built their model on the foundation of a set of critical success factors for
policy implementation that have been identified by Edwards in his 1980 paper, Implementing
Public Policy [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002]. Edwards classifies these influencing factors in four
categories:
1. Degree of clarity, accuracy and consistency of communication regarding policy imple-
mentation
2. The availability of resources including human, financial and information to support the
implementation
3. The disposition of implementers, usually a function of organisational culture
4. The organisational structure within which the policy implementation is being rolled
out
The above four factors were expanded into a theoretical framework based on existing research
and case studies to capture the extent of PB2 implementation in Florida’s budget process
[Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002]. The resulting causal-loop diagram, depicted in Figure 4.4, shows
the interactions between the different variables influencing the system.
Grizzle and Pettijohn utilise this model to gain insights into the status of Florida’s implemen-
tation, to understand which variables have higher influence and how these affect the behaviour
of the system over time [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
Considerations for this study:
The model’s behaviour is considered through the lens of Edwards’ four implementation factors.
These features, as they relate to this study, are discussed below.
Grizzle and Pettijohn highlight the fact that the state’s overarching accountability model
governing budgeting processes is well documented and understood. However, how the budget
reform is actually communicated and implemented is less clear. They go on to articulate
the numerous stakeholder groups that need to be involved in agreeing on performance measures
and operating guidelines and how the resulting messaging is often confusing and conflicting
[Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
International NGO’s with decentralised structures are susceptible to these challenges as they
have governance and management decision making structures on an international and country
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Figure 4.4: Policy implementation causal-loop diagram [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002]
level. ActionAid and Greenpeace both have clear allocation policies with accompanying ac-
countability mechanisms, however practical implementation is delegated and so confidence in
the decision makers’ authority is critical to ensure successful implementation.
Most policy implementations require additional resourcing and capacity building. Not
only for those responsible for quantitative analysis and decision making but also for those
individual projects required to comply with new funding proposal and monitoring processes
[Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
International NGOs are diverse organisations with different sizes of country offices and different
types of programmes. Overly technical processes tend to put pressure on smaller offices as
their decision making structures may not have the capacity to respond to detailed information
requests. This needs to be taken into account in terms of time (i.e. progressive compliance),
capacity, and the human and financial resources that are required when implementing a new
resource allocation mechanism.
Another interesting point to note is the impact of resource scarcity on the model. Grizzle
and Pettijohn’s research reveal that resource scarcity could potentially reinforce the need for
budget allocation decisions to be based on robust performance data, especially when budget
needs cannot be met [Grizzle and Pettijohn, 2002].
International NGOs have an accountability to donors and to beneficiaries to ensure that funds
are allocated to maximise programmatic impact. It is especially important that any repriori-
tisation or reallocation decisions are be based on agreed performance measures and criteria
closely linked to the organisational values.
The above provide important insights into policy implementation within organisations. These
aspects will be considered as they relate to the variables chosen for the resource allocation
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model in this study and how performance of such a model is evaluated.
4.3.4 Reflection on system dynamics literature
Wise words from Sterman [2000], echoed by a number of system dynamics practitioners, em-
phasise the importance of building a system dynamics model around a problem/problematic
situation rather than attempting to model the system in its entirety. This is important advice
as the resource allocation model explored in this study will be concentrating on the behaviours
and circumstances that lead to a balanced allocation, meeting the requirements of decision
makers whilst being robust against unanticipated externalities.
Although this model will not be all-encompassing and rather focussed on balancing allocation,
Saeed’s case study on income distribution raises important points about the dangers of ignoring
important factors, specifically in policy development, that influence a model’s behaviour. One
such factor relevant to the resource allocation model will be that of the influence of ear-
marked funds on such an allocation system. Tempting as it may to disregard such funds,
as decision makers have little control over their allocation (and these funds generally flow
through separate processes), the ability for these funds to skew allocations presents a very real
challenge. The incorporation of ear-marked funds into a system dynamics model such as this
may provide useful insights in this regard.
The effect of delays, whether its in the transfer of information or the transfer of physical
funds is a hindrance and common in reality decision makers face with resource allocation. Weil
[2007] discusses the limitations of long term strategies based on short to mid term information.
It is therefore important to incorporate appropriate delays into the resource allocation model
to better understand their effects on the long term performance of the mechanism.
The next section shift the focus to the process of developing a system dynamics model. It
considers how “soft” OR techniques can be employed to better structure a problem that forms
the basis of the simulation model. This is necessary when attempting to consolidate diverse
stakeholder opinions into one accepted representation of a situation or problem.
4.4 Operations research, system dynamics and resource allo-
cation
4.4.1 System dynamics and soft OR
Forrester, in his paper, System Dynamics, Systems Thinking, and Soft OR, introduces various
complementaries between system dynamics and soft1 OR techniques [Forrester, 1994]. As
discussed in the previous section, one of system dynamics most beneficial attributes is its
ability to incorporate complexity, non-linearity and feedback loop structures into its models,
allowing for a better representation of “real world” systems [Sterman, 2000]. However, actually
1Soft approaches are more suited to problems that are not easy to define, where modelling generates insights
about the real world and the concern is with the “how” and not the “what”. Soft approaches assumes that
people’s perceptions of the world vary and that their preferences may also differ [Checkland and Scholes, 1990].
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developing such a model that adequately represents a real world issue [Forrester, 1994] can be
more art than science. In addition, as is evident from the case studies mentioned previously,
implementing policy changes that are informed by recommendations from the model can be a
serious challenge [Forrester, 1994].
Forrester acknowledges that system dynamics projects can benefit immensely from soft OR
techniques in order to support a project’s interactions with people/social processes. This
would increase the likelihood of decision makers implementing the recommendations based on
the results of the system dynamics model.
Figure 4.5: System dynamics methodology [Forrester, 1994]
In Figure 4.5, Forrester depicts the system dynamics methodology, beginning with identifica-
tion of an “undesirable system”, transforming it into a model that can be simulated. These
simulations can be used to test alternatives and develop recommendations for discussion, with
the ultimate goal to implement changes that will result in an improved system [Forrester,
1994]. Soft OR techniques can prove particularly useful in this process. For example, in Step
1, problem structuring methodologies2 (PSMs) can assist in model conceptualisation whilst
decision conferencing or scenario planning can assist with Steps 4, 5 and 6, engaging stake-
holders and decision makers in the implementation of system improvements. Two examples of
such techniques and their application are briefly discussed below:
• Strategic Options Development and Analysis (SODA) is a problem structuring
methodology that is often employed to make sense of messy, complex problems [Eden and
Ackermann, 2001]. A differentiating factor from its peer methodologies, SODA places
equal emphasis on process and content [Eden and Ackermann, 2001]. Cognitive mapping
tools are used to depict an individual’s perception of a problem (complexity, structure,
2According to Shaw, Franco and Westcombe [Shaw et al., 2006] problem structuring methodologies (PSMs)
can be described as a set of participatory methods with an aim to engage stakeholders to gain a collective
understanding of a problem. Usually such a problem is complex, plagued with uncertainty, with stakeholders
bring differing perspective and conflicting objectives [Shaw et al., 2006].
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behaviour, relationships etc.) and these are then discussed collectively [Eden and Acker-
mann, 2001]. These cognitive maps, although personal constructs, could provide useful
starting point for conceptualising system dynamics models.
• Decision conferencing and analysis is a process through which stakeholders are
brought together to address a particular, mutually concerning problem [Phillips and
Bana e Costa, 2007]. The process is usually facilitated by an independent specialist who
assists in the development of instant models. The group can then interact and reflect
upon these models, experiencing in real time how different decisions or changes affect the
model [Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007].
It is important to note that the models used in decision conferencing processes are not
proposed/optimal models, rather models to assist with discussion and debate within the
stakeholder group [Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007]. This type of social process, coupled
with the technical system dynamics modelling, can be beneficial as the stakeholders
themselves (often decision makers) retain ownership of the problem, engage throughout
the process, debating with each other and with the modellers on the representation of
issues, results, proposed changes etc. This lays a foundation for a potentially easier
implementation process.
Note, the above examples are used for illustrative purposes only and their detailed application
is beyond the scope of this study.
4.4.2 Other OR techniques and their application in resource allocation
Resource allocation has been discussed more extensively in the quantitative realm of OR, with
the acknowledgement that the qualitative, “soft” OR techniques, as mentioned above, remain
critical for any sort of substantial implementation.
Phillips and Bana e Costa succinctly summarise the characteristics typical of “real world”
allocation decisions as the following [Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007]:
1. Benefits described by multiple and often conflicting objectives
2. Decision makers cannot digest all the details and consequences of each project
3. Individual allocations often do not result in the best collective result (i.e. optimal usage
of total resource)
4. Resource allocation processes themselves are often cumbersome, political and highly con-
tentious, susceptible to power plays as different units compete for resources
5. Resource allocation, if not managed properly, can result in allocations not aligned to
organisational or strategic objectives
The above serves as a useful reality check and another reminder of the importance of support-
ing group/social processes no matter which technical, quantitative approach is employed for
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quantitative modelling. This notion underpins Phillips and Bana e Costa’s paper as they in-
vestigate the combination of the technical modelling approach of Multi-Criteria Decision Anal-
ysis3 (MCDA) and the social process of decision conferencing. Combining these approaches
enables stakeholder to engage in the analysis, explore option or projects whilst prioritising
organisational interest over individual interest [Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007]. Case studies
prove the increased value of combining both technical modelling and social processes. However
this should not discredit the importance of a high-quality model with which stakeholders can
confidently engage [Phillips and Bana e Costa, 2007].
Montibeller and Franco further explore resource allocation modelling from a problem struc-
turing perspective. They acknowledge that allocation challenges not only arise when choosing
from an existing list of projects, but challenges also present themselves in how such a list is
constructed in the first place [Montibeller and Franco, 2009]. Montibeller and Franco produce
a framework that looks to structure Multiple Criteria and Area Portfolio Analysis (Multi-
CAPA4) models.
Their resulting framework considers different methods (and combination of methods) in which
to structure criteria, options and areas (areas are made up of groups of options) required to
inform the Multi-CAPA models [Montibeller and Franco, 2009]:
• Structuring options and areas is explored either top-down, identifying areas first and
then considering options within each area, or bottom-up, brainstorm options and then
group into areas.
• Criteria is structured either through alternative-focussed thinking, defining criteria
according to option characteristics or value-focussed thinking, criteria based on organisa-
tions value and strategic objectives.
Different combinations of the above approaches can be utilised depending on the organisation
structure, decision making culture and nature of allocation context.
Stewart, French and Rios present their explorations of integrating MCDA and scenario
planning, investigating how the combination of these approaches can add value to decision
makers, enabling a better understanding of the uncertainties and risks that impact long term
strategic decisions [Stewart et al., 2013]. In their paper published in 2013, Stewart, French
and Rios present a framework that considers how management preferences against different
elevation/performance criteria can be expressed within or across different sets of scenarios.
The idea is that the larger, unwieldy external uncertainties are captured across the different
scenarios, and uncertainties within scenarios can be modelled with probability theory [Stewart
et al., 2013]. This is illustrated with an example which explores agriculture policy decisions
against various climate-related scenarios [Stewart et al., 2013].
The combination of these two approaches provide an avenue for incorporating probability the-
ory (as the method for modelling uncertainties in quantitative decision analysis) in a manage-
able process for decision makers. It uses a creative scenario planning approach that stimulates
3Phillips and Bana e Costa [2007] describe MCDA as a decision modelling technique that explicitly considers
multiple (often conflicting) criteria in decision making situation. Although, MCDA as a concept, is much
broader.
4Multi-CAPA is an extension of MCDA which can accommodate allocation between single projects and
groups of projects organised according to function, geography, objective etc. [Montibeller and Franco, 2009].
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“out the box” thinking that is supported by a formal analytical approach (MCDA) that can
handle ambiguity and imperfection but can also provide a sense of consistency, rigour and
robustness to the process [Stewart et al., 2013].
4.4.3 Reflection on OR literature
It is evident from the above that both quantitative approaches and social approaches play
important roles in applied research. The development of a sound model or framework is critical,
however its the application of such models and frameworks that bring about departures from
the norm, influences decision makers and has the ability to realise change outside of a simulated
environment.
Although this study primarily uses a system dynamics approach, it is for the above reasons
that it is complimented with soft OR techniques. This study makes use of problem structuring
methods to better represent the management challenges that surround resource allocation in
a meaningful way. This will then be transformed into a system dynamics model for simulation
and further analysis.
Of the above mentioned soft OR techniques, Strategic Options Development and Analysis
(SODA) was chosen as the primary PSM tool to capture resource allocation using causal
mapping representation. In addition, elements of Soft Systems Methods (SSM) were also
employed to enrich the process and to gain potentially new or different perspectives from
stakeholders.
The study limits its application to these two soft OR methods whilst acknowledges these as
supplementary to the overarching modelling process.
Stakeholder engagement is a crucial aspect to this study and a determining factor for
whether this research will have an opportunity for application. Although the stakeholders
who were approached were forthcoming with their contributions, especially in describing the
current resource allocation mechanisms in place today, engagement was sporadic and tailed off
towards the end of this study. Stakeholders were able to provide their professional opinions
with regards to the outcomes of the study which led to some surmising about changes that
could be feasibly implemented.
The absence of substantial discussions and opportunities for focus groups limited the abil-
ity to employ MCDA or scenario planning to further prioritise and evaluate outcomes and
recommendations. This could be explored in future studies.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The literature discusses many applications of system dynamics, OR and other analytical tech-
niques that can aid decision makers in management, policy development or simply provide
deeper understanding of how and why current systems behave the way they do.
The international NGO environment, as discussed in Chapter 2, is at a tipping point and
provides an exciting new opportunity to embrace such modelling techniques in order to improve
32
CHAPTER 4. LITERATURE REVIEW
their management systems. The applied nature of this discipline means that the interpretation
of any model and its results, coupled with deep understanding of the management situation that
can be well communicated with stakeholders, is critical in bringing this theory into practice,
in other words “easier modelled than implemented...”
With limited influence over any specific management decision makers, this study provides an
opportunity to expose management and decision makers with a glimpse into the power of such
analytical techniques to aid decision making and potentially engage further or utilise similar
approaches in future processes.
The modelling process that follows will focus on resource allocation at a “global” level, in
other words looking at the overall organisation as a group of entities rather than at any
specific country office. As most of these international NGOs consist of a diverse set of country
offices with varying sizes, it will be difficult to model these country offices individually. The
modelling process will therefore include a classification of the various entities in order to create
a manageable model whilst still reflective of the macro dynamics at a “global” level. Should any
policy changes, or changes to resource allocation mechanisms be considered for implementation
further system dynamics modelling should be conducted at a more detailed level to understand
implications for specific country offices and/or other entities.
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Chapter 5
Stakeholder Feedback and Problem
Structuring
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the application of problem structuring methods to the resource al-
location descriptions and challenges that were gathered during the stakeholder engagement
process.
The resource allocation context is recapped in the call out box on the following page, setting the
scene for the summary of themes and challenges described by the various stakeholders through
a series of interviews1. It is important to reiterate that the purpose of these stakeholder
interviews was to gain insight into the common resource allocation challenges that may be of
interest from a system dynamics modelling perspective.
An overview of problem structuring methods is provided, describing the motivation and ap-
plicability of such methods when structuring problems for formal modelling. Two problem
structuring methods are introduced and applied, namely, Soft Systems Methods (SSM) and
Strategic Options Decisions Analysis (SODA). These methods are used to structure the stake-
holder feedback, detailing the core components, processes, structures and relationships that
are most pertinent for the model development.
The outputs of SSM (a rich picture, root definitions and CATWOE analysis) and SODA (a
cognitive map) are then analysed and key considerations discussed through the lens of the
system dynamics modelling process that will follow in the next chapter.
1Detailed transcripts or voice recordings have not been included in this document. A summary of key themes
and challenges upon which the generic resource allocation model is built is considered sufficient for the purposes
of this study.
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Recapping the resource allocation context: As was discussed in the Introduction
and Background chapters of this study, the development and environmental sectors
are evolving. Programmatic approaches for tackling sustainable development issues to
build equal and just societies have changed. As such, international NGOs, as major
players in this sector, are also adapting their structures and processes to the changing
environment in order to increase impact. One such organisational change is the move
towards a more decentralised structure that promotes collective decision making. Such
structures are federal in nature.
An organisation with a federal structure is often membership based, i.e. consti-
tuted of a number of independent national and/or regional offices. These national
and/or regional offices are governed by national governance structures, responsible for
the individual office as well as playing a representative role in the federation. This
two-part (national and federal) role is often referred to as “dual citizenship”.
Although some international NGOs have moved towards a federal structure, such
structures are considered more cumbersome than the old “command and control” type
structures. Specifically, the processes of allocating resources between different offices
needed to change in order to reflect federal values. For example, what was previously
a small group of decision makers allocating resources has now changed into a more
representative and collective process resulting in the requirement of a more formal
framework to govern resource allocation decisions.
Many international NGOs have developed such frameworks over the last few years,
however these frameworks have a tendency to be complicated, requiring consistent
revision in response to extremely volatile economic and political climates. And although
collective decision making brings a quality of diverse perspectives, it also often brings
conflicting views and objectives that add complexity.
5.2 Summary of stakeholder feedback
A series of interviews was held with individuals from Greenpeace International and ActionAid
International and other professionals within the sector to gain an understanding of existing
resource allocation mechanisms and the related management challenges. Perspectives2 were
drawn from international finance and fundraising, international general management, as well
as challenges from fundraising offices and programming offices.
Interviewees were selected based on individual interactions whilst at ActionAid International.
Those who were directly involved in the resource allocation revision process were invited to
participate in this study, ensuring adequate representation of the different “world views” that
are outlined in Section 5.4.2. Supporting evidence was gathered through secondary surveys
that were conducted, primarily to gather internal stakeholder feedback on ActionAids revised
2These were individual perspectives and do not represent a formal, organisational position.
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resource allocation framework as well as first hand observations in various management meet-
ings where related discussions and decision took place. Based on referrals with the first round
of interviewees within ActionAid International, additional stakeholders from peer organisa-
tions such as Greenpeace International, Amnesty International and MSF were identified and
engaged to provide external perspectives. Interviews were conducted either face-to-face or via
Skype between year 2015 and 2016. It is important to emphasis that interviews were based on
existing relationships and individual interest in this study as opposed to a random sampling
method.
The stakeholder interviews that were conducted are summarised in Table 5.1.
Number Organisation Role Title Interview Theme Interview Du-
ration
1. ActionAid
International
Chief Executive Strategic and political role of re-
source allocation policies in a
decentralised federation
45 minutes
2. ActionAid
International
Federation
Development
Director
Programme planning implica-
tions at national level
60 minutes
3. ActionAid
International
Fundraising
Specialist
Impact of pooling parameters on
individual fundraising offices
45 minutes
4. ActionAid
International
Finance Spe-
cialist
Financial sustainability aspects
of resource allocation
45 minutes
5. ActionAid
International
Regional Coor-
dinator
Stakeholder consultation in re-
source allocation revisions
45 minutes
6. ActionAid
International
Country Direc-
tor
Role of resource allocation in
distributing power
60 minutes
7. Independent Resource Al-
location Con-
sultant for
ActionAid
International
Evolution of resource allocation
frameworks in ActionAid
60 minutes
8. Independent Organisational
Development
Consultant for
INGOs
Comparison of governance
structures of INGOs with
respect to resource allocation
60 minutes
9. Greenpeace In-
ternational
Finance Direc-
tor
Detailed characteristics of re-
source allocation in Greenpeace
60 minutes
10. Greenpeace In-
ternational
Operations Di-
rector
Greenpeace organisational
structure and its implications
on resource allocation
60 minutes
11. Amnesty Inter-
national
Organisational
Specialist
Brief overview of resource allo-
cation in Amnesty
45 minutes
12. Me´decins Sans
Frontie`res
(MSF) Interna-
tional
Finance Spe-
cialist
Brief overview of of resource al-
location in MSF
45 minutes
Table 5.1: Summary of stakeholder interviews
A number of resource allocation challenges were discussed during the stakeholder interviews.
The resource allocation challenges that are most relevant to this study are summarised
below:
37
CHAPTER 5. STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK AND PROBLEM STRUCTURING
1. Resource allocation processes do not adequately deal with resources that are restricted
at source, creating a potential imbalance. For example, if an individual bequeaths GBP1
million to a project in country x, this donation generally circumvents the allocation
process going directly to country x. Should this donation perhaps be taken into account
and the collective allocation amount adjusted?
2. There tends to be a disproportionate level of influence over funds allocation, with fundrais-
ing countries having more of say than programme countries. Should fundraising countries’
make available surplus reserves for collective allocation at a federation level?
3. Resource allocation processes are fairly static, they tend to be slow in reacting to external
uncertainty and as such do not enable predictability and compliance from countries.
For example, a market crash in country x may result in the country not being able to
contribute any funds for pooling. Should there be allowances in the pooling mechanism
for such cases? What are the risks to the overall federation if there is a shortfall?
These challenges exist in an already complex organisational structure and therefore makes for
an interesting study through the lens of system dynamics. However, in order to get to a point
where a model can be built, the above management descriptions need to be presented in a
more structured format.
Problem structuring methods are therefore employed to firstly translate the above manage-
ment descriptions of resource allocation challenges, into a more structured format, which will
ultimately form the basis for the actual system dynamics model.
5.3 Introduction to problem structuring
As discussed in the Literature Review chapter, soft OR techniques can complement the system
dynamics methodology, supporting stakeholders to straddle between the “real world situation”
and its interpretation into the “systems thinking world” [Forrester, 1994]. Initially, soft OR
(specifically problem structuring methods) can help create consensus amongst stakeholders in
structuring a “real world” problem/problematic system that can be used to build the system
dynamics model. Towards the end of the modelling process, once the system dynamics model
has developed with its recommendations, soft OR techniques can be re-employed to assist
stakeholders in deciding which changes should be prioritised for implementation [Forrester,
1994].
In this section, two problem structuring methods (PSMs) are introduced and applied to re-
source allocation, the “problematic situation” that is the focus of this study. The following
two PSMs are applied in this study:
1. Soft Systems Methods: This is Peter Checkland’s approach of expressing a problem-
atic situation through its core systems in a standard way . This approach is particularly
complementary as it captures multiple stakeholder perspectives and presents them in a
consistent framework [Checkland and Poulter, 2006].
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2. Strategic Options Decision Analysis: This is Eden and Ackerman’s approach of
structuring a problem through stakeholder involvement, drawing information from stake-
holders using individual interviews and devising cognitive maps that capture the ideas
[Eden and Ackermann, 1998].
The following sections describe how these methods have been applied to the resource allocation
mechanism and related challenges as described by the stakeholders. Key considerations are
summarised to inform the model development.
5.4 The application of Soft Systems Methods
In essence, Soft Systems Methods (SSM) takes a complex human situation/problem and ex-
presses its core constituent systems in a standard way that is representative of the stakeholders’
description [Checkland and Poulter, 2006]. It captures the key elements of a problem, whilst
taking into account a variety of stakeholder perspectives [Checkland and Poulter, 2006]. Al-
though SSM was developed as a modelling tool in systems engineering, the models are not
supposed to represent the “real world”. Rather, by using systems rules and principles, it
allows stakeholders to structure their thinking about a real world situation [Checkland and
Poulter, 2006].
The SSM process is summarised in the following four steps :
1. Learn about the problematic situation, including the social and political aspects that
may influence the situation
2. Create relevant models of purposeful activity that are built based on a particular aspect
or view of the situation
3. Discuss the situation using the models to identify feasible actions that result in a desir-
able change
4. Take action to improve the situation [Checkland and Poulter, 2006]
Checkland and Poulter [2006] reminds us that the above steps are not necessarily sequential,
some activities may take place simultaneously and with various iterations .
This study uses a combination of the following three SSM techniques, namely:
1. Rich pictures
2. Root definitions
3. CATWOE analysis
These techniques are used to define the resource allocation problem in a way that is representa-
tive of stakeholder feedback whilst sufficiently structured for easy translation, in this context,
into a system dynamics model.
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5.4.1 Rich picture analysis
Given the current resource allocation challenges within international NGOs, SSM’s Rich Pic-
ture technique is used to visually represent a resource allocation mechanism in its current
context. This is just one interpretation and by no means all-encompassing.
Rich Pictures:
Checkland and Poulter [2006] highlight the importance of understanding the many interacting
relationships and prominent features in complex, problematic situations. Such relationships are
often better understood through visual representation rather than through words [Checkland
and Poulter, 2006]. It is now common practice in SSM to use pictures to capture the different
stakeholder perspectives of a certain situation. Through a process of inquiry, the picture is
further developed, adding the “richness” of the different entities, structures, players, social and
political influences etc. that may contribute to a situation being problematic. Checkland and
Poulter [2006] note that such drawings can never fully capture a real situation (nor should they).
However, this technique has proven to be a very useful tool to express the core components of a
situation in a way with which stakeholders can easily engage, drawing consensus or identifying
conflicting views on different aspects of the situation.
Checkland and Poulter [2006] provide some guidance on the key elements that should be
considered when developing a rich picture. These elements are articulated below and applied
to resource allocation in the context of this study:
• Structures - The key organisational structures involved in resource allocation are the
head office which coordinates the resource allocation process, the fundraising offices that
determine the amount of resources available and the programme offices that receive the
funds to meet their requirements.
• Processes - The processes involved are those in relation to funds pooling and funds
allocation.
• Climate - Political and economic climates affect the amount of funds available for pool-
ing. Higher economic growth provides opportunities to increase funds whilst lower growth
may result in decline of overall income (increasing competition for funds). Various polit-
ical positions may influence where and how resources should be allocated.
• People - The external stakeholders in resource allocation include governments, donors
and supporters and programme beneficiaries. Internal stakeholders include governance
and management staff at the federation (international) and national levels.
• Issues expressed by people - Some of the key issues that have been expressed by
stakeholders include the complexity of the process, the sluggishness to respond to external
uncertainty, the ability of earmarked funds to skew allocations and the different bodies
of decision makers involved in the process.
• Conflicts - Different stakeholders have different priorities when it comes to the pooling
and allocation of funds.“Dual citizenship” is an example of one such conflict, as man-
agement need to consider both federation/international objectives as well as country
objectives when making decisions.
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The above elements are incorporated into into a rich picture in Figure 5.1, a simple illustration
aimed to synthesise the stakeholder discussion.
The rich picture in Figure 5.1 depicts resource allocation within the context of a collective, rep-
resentative decision making (i.e. decentralised structure). This picture shows the funds flowing
through a centrally coordinated mechanism, overseen by a representative decision making body
which incorporates requirements from donors as well as community needs, through a jointly
agreed strategy. This strategy guides how funds are allocated. The picture also shows the
impact of externalities that can affect both programme and funding requirements such as eco-
nomic or political uncertainty. The orange arrow depict the earmarked funds that flow outside
of the allocation process which can potentially create an imbalance.
Although a rich picture has the advantage of capturing the interplay of different relationships,
processes and structures on a single page, additional SSM tools are required to explore the
stakeholders different perspectives and requirements of resource allocation. These perspec-
tives form the basis of three “worldviews” which are analysed in the next section, using root
definitions and CATWOE analysis.
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5.4.2 Root definitions and CATWOE analysis
Based on stakeholder engagement, three worldviews are considered for further exploration
through Checkland’s CATWOE analysis. These worldviews are also represented as root def-
initions, statements about the system activities, that will inform the model building process
[Checkland and Poulter, 2006].
A root definition is a statement that provides a sense of the overall concept being modelled
and is often written in the following form, “A system to do x by y in order to achieve z”.
CATWOE analysis breaks down the key elements of the model, grouping them into different
categories. These elements include variables affected by the system, those responsible for
decisions, why the system exists, what it wants to achieve and the boundaries within which
it operates [Checkland and Poulter, 2006]. Checkland and Poulter [2006] offer CATWOE as a
mnemonic (Client, Actor, Transformation, World view, Owner, External) to categorise these
elements. This is depicted in tabular form in Table 5.2.
Clients The victims or beneficiaries of a system
Actors Those who would operate the system
Transformation The core processes that drive the system behaviour
Worldview The worldview that makes this system meaningful in this context
Owners Those who could stop the system
External Elements or constraints outside the system which are a given
Table 5.2: The CATWOE mnemonic [Checkland and Poulter, 2006]
Outlined below are the root definitions and CATWOE analyses for three worldviews:
1. Federation
2. Programme
3. Fundraising
These worldviews are chosen as they represent the different, sometimes conflicting, priorities
and requirements of a resource allocation mechanism within a decentralised international NGO.
For example, fundraising offices would seek a mechanism that would enable income growth.
In addition, fundraising offices would need to ensure that funds raised from respective donors
are allocated within the boundaries of the donor agreements. Programme offices, on the other
hand, would want to ensure that funds can be allocated to programmes that create the most
impact within their country, generally in line with their national development plans. From a
global, federation perspective, it is important that an allocation mechanism enables financial
sustainability, enabling income growth, whilst also ensuring that programmatic goals are met
both at a national and international level.
It is important to note that each of these worldviews can be interpreted in many different ways.
What follows is one possible interpretation for each, based on the stakeholder feedback, with
supporting root definitions and CATWOE analyses.
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1. Federation worldview: Resource allocation should be a system that makes a federation
more than the sum of its parts, enabling transformational and systemic change.
The emphasis of the federation worldview is that sustainable transformational change can only
be achieved through a collective programme strategy, at an international level as well as at
regional and country levels. This is translated into the following root definition and CATWOE
representation in Table 5.3.
Federation root definition:A system to pool and allocate federation resources by a collective
representative decision making body to maximise global programme impact.
Clients All members and offices of the federation
Actors Federation leadership (international and country leadership)
Transformation
A centralised allocation function, transformed into a decen-
tralised, collective resource allocation to align with organi-
sational values
Worldview Collective federation impact to achieve sustainable change
Owners Representative governance body
External
Volatile economic climate, limited growth, constricting de-
velopment aid frameworks
Table 5.3: Federation CATWOE elements
2. Programme worldview: Resource allocation should ensure that programmes can meet
their objectives and respond to their beneficiaries’ needs.
The emphasis here is to ensure the programmes receive reliable and predictable income to
implement projects that meet the needs of their beneficiaries. This is translated into the
following root definition and CATWOE representation in Table 5.4.
Programme root definition: A system that allows for programmes to plan with predictable
income and which is governed by a transparent decision making process.
Clients Beneficiaries and communities
Actors Country and Programme management
Transformation Funds generated transformed into predictable income to allocate to programmes to meet their goals
Worldview Programme objectives led by community and beneficiary needs
Owners Representative governance body
External
Political climate hindering programme, humanitarian emer-
gencies threatening beneficiaries
Table 5.4: Programme CATWOE elements
3. Fundraising worldview: Resource allocation should be used to allow more funds to be
raised to grow the organisation and increase impact.
The emphasis here is to establish a resource allocation mechanism so that funds requested for
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pooling from fundraising offices are realistic and that targets are flexible and can be adjusted.
This is translated into the following root definition and CATWOE representation in Table 5.5.
Fundraising root definition: A system to realistically pool funds, that can take into ac-
count fluctuations in fundraising environments in order to better realistically plan and meeting
fundraising targets.
Clients Donors
Actors Country and Fundraising management
Transformation
Realistic funds pooling mechanism that can transform fluc-
tuating income into smoothed budget flows
Worldview Fundraising strategies to support a financially sustainable federation
Owners Representative governance body
External
Volatile economic climate, competition for funds, increasing
donor requirements
Table 5.5: Fundraising CATWOE elements
5.4.3 Considerations for model development
SSMs ensure that the stakeholders’ descriptions of “real life” resource allocation examples are
adequately represented for the modelling process.
The three worldviews that were used to form the root definitions and CATWOE analyses
(federation, programme and fundraising) have different degrees of power and influence over
resource allocation decisions. These various levels of influence need to be addressed through
the modelling process and the subsequent simulations and experimental runs, in order to
investigate the change in (or not) behaviour of the allocation framework and its effect on the
performance criteria.
The effect of external uncertainty has been a prominent feature in discussions throughout the
stakeholder engagements. It is therefore necessary for resource allocation mechanisms to be
robust against volatile environments that can affect fundraising, programme implementation
and organisational sustainability. It is important that the allocation mechanism has the ability
to promote a more agile organisation, in other words, making it easier for funds to be reallocated
in order for the organisation to have the resources to better respond to changing circumstances.
The following section continues with problem structuring methods. The application of SODA,
the second problem structuring method, is described in the next section and yields different
lessons and insights.
5.5 The application of Strategic Options Decision Analysis
Strategic Options Decision Analysis (SODA) is used to design problem solving interventions
by mapping stakeholder views [Eden and Ackermann, 1998]. The key philosophy of SODA
is one of structuring a problem through stakeholder involvement. In other words, SODA
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draws out information from stakeholder groups using individual interviews and the ideas are
captured on cognitive maps [Eden and Ackermann, 1998]. Cognitive maps provide an avenue
to capture a stakeholder’s view on a specific problematic situation and to structure this view
unpacking goals, objectives, issues, conflicting relationships, feedback loops and so on [Eden
and Ackermann, 1998]. Once individual cognitive maps are developed based on individual
conversations, these maps can then be merged to produce a strategic map which can then form
the basis for further discussion and analysis.
Cognitive maps, in the stricter sense, map out a series of choices, i.e. do I do this OR
do I do that. Each, choice, referred to as a concept in the map is written with three dots
(...) to indicate its bi-polarity. For example, the choice between centralised and decentralised
decision making, as a concept in a cognitive map, would be written as centralised decision
making... decentralised decision making, the three dots indicating the alternative choice as
decentralisation. These bi-polar concepts are then linked together with arrows that indicate a
relationship which can either be positive or negative. By default, an arrow indicators a positive
or reinforcing relationship, i.e. the behaviour of x will result in a reinforcing behaviour in y.
To depict a negative relationship, a negative (-) sign appears next to an arrow. This means
that the behaviour of x will result in a opposing/balancing behaviour in y [Ackermann et al.,
1990]. This relationship is illustrated in the simple example in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Example of conecpts in a cognitive map
5.5.1 Cognitive mapping of resource allocation
The resource allocation problem is expressed as a cognitive map to assist in the development of
the subsequent system dynamics model. The cognitive map that has been produced is based on
stakeholder interviews and aims to explore the core purpose of resource allocation as well
as management challenges that impact some of the current resource allocation frameworks
in practice.
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Overview of resource allocation cognitive map:
The concepts (sometimes referred to as nodes) in the cognitive map in Figure 5.3 have been
colour coded to represent three groups. The concepts in red show the intention of the resource
allocation mechanism and how it supports the international NGO’s values of collective deci-
sion making and creating legitimacy within the countries and communities within which the
programmes are delivered. The concepts in blue illustrate how an unbalanced allocation can
affect power dynamics and have a negative effect on the international NGO’s performance and
implementation of the resource allocation itself. The concepts in green look at the balance
between future allocation (through investments) and current expenditure and the impact it
has on cash flow and reliability of income for programmes as well as the longer term impact
on the organisation’s ability to be responsive to external uncertainties.
Drivers and goals:
When developing cognitive maps, some concepts can be identified as having overall influence on
the map. These concepts are known as drivers and typically have no other concepts influencing
them or feeding into them. The key driver identified in this map is the external environment
within which international NGOs operate. The extent of external volatility, whether it be
economic volatility (influencing fundraising), political or even climate volatility (influencing
programmes) has an overall influence over allocation decisions.
In contrast to drivers, a cognitive map’s goals are concepts which ultimately are ends in
their own minds, representing the objectives or overall aims of the situation that the map
represents. In this cognitive map, three goals have been identified. The first is the ability of
resource allocation decisions to promote organisational agility, allowing international NGOs
to be responsive and adaptive in their environments. The second is related to programme
performance, the goal of achieving sustainable, transformational change which is at the core
of the overall organisational strategy. The third is shorter term programmatic goal, the degree
to which immediate programme objectives are met, ensuring that allocation decisions are
adequate to deliver current programmes and projects.
Feedback loops:
There are a number of feedback loops that are apparent in the cognitive map and these assist
in anticipating the behaviour that could be simulated once the map is translated into a model.
The first relates to the impact of earmarked funds and their ability, if unchecked, to have a
reinforcing effect on allocation imbalances in the federation. For example, those country offices
that benefit from earmarked funds, gain more experience in handling the requirements that
are attached to earmarked funds and thus are more likely to be successful in receiving such
funds in the future. This may cause a saturation of funds in a small number of country offices.
Another reinforcing feedback loop is evident in the relationship between the ability to raise un-
restricted funds and the ability to drive sustainable change. For example, if there is an increase
in unrestricted funds then the organisation has increased ability to allocate funds according
to global programme objectives. This increases the legitimacy of their operations in program-
ming areas, increasing their ability to gain more support from their local constituencies to
drive sustainable change with beneficiaries. This ultimately leads to increased impact and the
organisation’s ability to deliver its strategy. This therefore enhances their brand recognition,
thereby enabling more unrestricted funds to be raised.
48
CHAPTER 5. STAKEHOLDER FEEDBACK AND PROBLEM STRUCTURING
Both of these loops related to the impact of earmarked funds on an allocation mechanism.
This is further explored in the modelling process.
5.5.2 Considerations for model development
Based on the application of the SODA technique of cognitive mapping, the primary additional
consideration for the model is revealed is the incorporation of earmarked funds into the allo-
cation mechanism. Typically these funds are governed by separate processes and this hinders
the line of sight across all related allocation processes.
In addition, earmarked funds can potentially impact the optimal allocation of funds. This also
has the ability to influence the power dynamics of the organisation which is an important aspect
to consider in a decentralised structure where decision making is collective. Even although
formal power in a federal structure is decentralised through membership regulations, those
country offices with more access to funds have access to an informal power that should be
recognised. This is not incorporated into this modelling process but should be considered in
future studies.
Finally, the cognitive map also revealed the importance of balancing the longer term strategic
impact which, as described, has the ability to influence supporter acquisition and unrestricted
fundraising, with the shorter term programme needs. Programme countries need to have a
flow of reliable funds in order to ensure their annual programme objectives are met whilst not
hindering the organisation’s ability to be agile and responsive to external uncertainty. The
system dynamics model aims to capture this requirement by incorporating of a set of “reserve”
variables, allowing funds to be kept aside at both federation and country level for responsive
reallocation.
5.6 Summary
The rich picture, coupled with the root definitions and CATWOE analyses of the three world-
views, provide some structure to the management descriptions of resource allocation gathered
through the stakeholder interviews. The rich picture serves as a visual point of reference when
creating the system dynamics model, ensuring that the core components and relationships
are present. The root definitions also prove as useful references when validating the model’s
behaviour, ensuring that the model is behaving reasonably, generating sensible results.
The cognitive map, presented in this chapter, identified the different feedback loops present in
current resource allocation mechanisms.
These insights, gained through the SSM and SODA analyses, will form the basis of the system
dynamics model that will be developed and discussed in the next chapter. The purpose of the
system dynamics model will be to simulate the effects of the above management challenges in a
quantitative modelling setting and o investigate which variables or amendments, based on the
root definitions and cognitive maps, result in interesting behaviour change in the model. The
behaviour of the system dynamics model will then be analysed in relation to the key issues
that were revealed in the stakeholder engagements.
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Chapter 6
System Dynamics Model
6.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces system dynamics as the modelling approach in this study and ar-
ticulates how key concepts identified in the problem structuring processes were chosen to be
incorporated into the system dynamics model. This chapter describes the model’s variables1
and also discusses the assumptions that underpin the model and describes model’s key features.
The generic model is used to develop management scenarios, testing a handful of management
criteria which were identified during the stakeholder engagement and problem structuring pro-
cesses. Ideally, the analysis and results would be shared with international NGO stakeholders,
however, given the limited access to stakeholders towards the end of this study, this was not
possible.
6.2 Introduction to systems dynamics
Sterman [2000] describes system dynamics as a method to better understand complex systems,
enable decision makers to identify potential challenges and create policies that effectively guide
such systems. Complex systems, especially dynamic complex systems, require more than our
minds can often process, not because of a combinatorial complexity but because of a dynamic
complexity [Sterman, 2000]. Dynamic complexity occurs when there are numerous interactions
of systems over a long period of time [Sterman, 2000]. This is apparent in a number of real
world systems. Sterman [2000] describes how one’s limited mental capacity when dealing with
such systems, often results in actions and decisions that fall short of the desired goal, or even
worse, creating a negative result [Sterman, 2000].
6.2.1 Dynamic complexity
According to Sterman [2000], dynamic complexity is inherent in systems that are constantly
changing with a high level of interdependency between their components. For example, man-
1A full list of variables, including their names, equations and descriptions can be found the Appendix.
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agement and policy decisions are often taken in response to other concurrent decisions, resulting
in different system behaviour. There is seldom a linear, one-to-one relationship between the
various components of a systems and they are often impacted by lengthy time delays. These
time delays mean that long term decisions are often based on short term information [Sterman,
2000].
The following subsections explain these core elements of a system dynamics model in more
detail.
6.2.2 Feedback and time delays
Sterman [2000] stresses the importance of understanding the impact of feedback loops and
time delays on systems. Each decision or policy amendment alters the state of the system
and this often results in unintended effects that are not sufficiently scrutinised. The analysis
of such feedback loops are usually tricky as the effect of these decisions are often not realised
until years later [Sterman, 2000]. As such, a system can find itself “course correcting” only
to end up somewhere entirely different. System dynamics takes into account these loops and
delays, ensuring that side effects and delayed reactions are reflected along side desired goals as
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1: A system responsive to feedback [Sterman, 2000]
6.2.3 Stocks and flows
Another core concept in system dynamics modelling is that of stocks and flows. These are
used to model the accumulation and dispersal of resources [Sterman, 2000]. A resource based
view can extend beyond the traditional cash, inventory, equipment etc. to consider underlying
accumulation of stock such as political capital and customer loyalty [Sterman, 2000].
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Figure 6.2 provides an example of capital as a stock with the new investments as the flow in
to the capital stock and the depreciation and/or consumption of capital as the outflow (a) as
well as how a stock and flow is represented in the modelling software(b).
Figure 6.2: Examples of stocks and flows [Sterman, 2000]
Although both types of stock and flows are present in most systems, for the purposes of this
resource allocation model, the stock that will primarily be analysed will be that of accumulated
funds with the flows in and out of the stocks depicting the flow of funds. Other effects such as
the influence of information or other decisions are represented as feedback loops, transforming
and influencing other parameters and variables.
6.2.4 From mapping to simulation
In order to capture the dynamic complexity of a system, certain tools are used to incorporate
the feedback loops into the modelling process [Sterman, 2000]. Feedback loops fall into two
categories, the first is a reinforcing loop, amplifying a certain behaviour and the second is a
balancing loop, self-correcting or counteracting behaviour [Sterman, 2000].
These feedback loops are typically uncovered during stakeholder engagement sessions and
mapped through a cognitive or causal mapping process, as described in Chapter 5. Each
system may contain many feedback loops and the mapping process is used to identify those
that are most relevant. Computer simulation is used to analyse the resulting behaviour, i.e.
the dynamic flow of stocks [Sterman, 2000].
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A simulation model is created by transforming the causal or cognitive map into level (stock)
and rate (flow) variables, represented by rectangles and “pipe” like connectors respectively as
depicted in Figure 6.2b [Sterman, 2000].
Once the model is represented visually, each variable needs to have an initial set of conditions
or parameters, usually estimates. Estimates are based on existing research, historical data,
professional judgement and other sources. The model is simulated with these initial default
parameters and the resulting behaviours are analysed. Parameters are then altered to gain
deeper insights into the system to resolve issues and improve the system [Sterman, 2000].
The following section describes how the above has been applied to create a generic resource
allocation model using Vensim PLE modelling software.
6.3 Resource allocation model overview
As presented in the previous chapter, exploring resource allocation within the international
NGO context is a complex task. Each stakeholder brings a different set of perspectives, often
opposing. Resource allocation within the federal context has the added burden of delivering
global and local objectives in addition to the optimisation of resources.
Based on this, a system dynamics modelling approach has been used to create a a resource
allocation model with the aim to illustrate the flow of funds through an international NGO
with a decentralised structure. This model specifically aims to demonstrate:
• How funds are pooled across different types of markets within the federation.
• How funds are allocated, taking into account pre-allocation restrictions (for earmarked
funds) and how flexible funds can potentially be used to balance any programme deficits.
Based on the above core processes, this model aims to investigate behaviour in relation to the
following areas, as was highlighted by key stakeholders:
• The impact of combining earmarked and flexible funds into a single process, allowing
earmarked funds to be offset by flexible funds where required and the impact of this
balancing effect.
• The behaviour of strategy performance, taking into account pre-allocation restric-
tions (for earmarked funds) and how flexible funds can potentially be used to balance
programme deficits.
• The behaviour of reserves, at various levels to provide a sense of the financial sustain-
ability and affordability of the allocation framework.
The above behaviours will be investigated through the simulation of different management
scenarios, altering different variables and parameters that may effect the performance of the
overall model.
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of income generated in the resource allocation model
The system dynamics model that was developed in Vensim PLE is depicted in Figure 6.4,
however Figure 6.3 provides a simplified diagram for illustrative purposes, to support the
written descriptions that follow.
As this is a generic model, the initial values of constants and other parameters have been
set fairly arbitrarily, based on what would seem reasonable for a mid-size international NGO.
The focus of the analysis is on the behaviour of the model in relation to “real life” resource
allocation challenges, not solve a specific problem or identify specific values of parameters.
6.4 Model description
This section describes, in detail, the core components of the model with accompanying screen-
shots of the Vensim model. It is important to reiterate that this model is the simplest repre-
sentation capturing the following key features:
• Two income generating variables generating two types of funds (earmarked and flexible)
• Earmarked funds are allocated to one of two Programmes (each with two different pro-
files)
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• Flexible funds pooled for collective allocation to either of the two Programmes, depending
on the size of the relevant deficit in each
• Programme performance is measured by the extent to which there is a deficit in either
Programme
• Performance against strategy measured according to the combination of the two Pro-
grammes’ performance
These key features are expanded upon in the following sub-sections. The model’s time rela-
tionship is a rate over 1 unit of time, driving the level (rate) variable.
Note: Vensim variable names are included in italics in the descriptions below for ease of
reference with the Vensim model in Figure 6.4. Also, a full list of variables, including their
names, equations and descriptions can be found the Appendix.
Figure 6.4: Generic resource allocation model
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6.4.1 Income generation and funding types:
Two different income rates are generated, one representing income generated from emerging
markets (EM) and the other representing income generated from mature markets (MM). This
categorisation is chosen to illustrate the differing fundraising environments in these two markets
as well as the trend of diversifying income sources through the expansion into emerging markets
as per stakeholder discussions.
Both income rates are normally distributed (Variable2 names: Random Normal Income Rate
MM and Random Normal Income Rate EM ) and include a random jump every five years
(Variables: Rate Changes) to mimic external uncertainty as a result of political or economic
fluctuations in fundraising markets such as a change in government aid policies.
Income generated in mature markets can be one of two types, either earmarked or flexible
(Variable names: Earmarked funds, Funds Available for Global Allocation - Mature Markets
and Funds Available for Global Allocation - Emerging Markets). Earmarked funds have a pre-
determined allocation and therefore are not available for collective allocation and are directed
towards a specific programme. In this simple model, there are only two programmes, Pro-
gramme X and Programme Y, that receive earmarked funds. The second type of funds,
flexible funds, do not have any pre-determined restrictions and can be pooled and allocated at
the organisation’s discretion.
In other words, funds raised in mature markets can be allocated in three different ways, de-
pending on their type:
1. Income generated and earmarked for Programme X.
2. Income generated and earmarked for Programme Y.
3. Income generated that is unrestricted, or flexible and available for collective allocation.
The diagram in Figure 6.5 is a high-level visual of how funds are generated in the model. In
Figure 6.6, the income generation and related variables are circled in red in the Vensim model.
2A full list of variables, including their names, equations and descriptions can be found the Appendix.
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Figure 6.5: Illustration of income generated in the resource allocation model
Figure 6.6: Income generation variables in the Vensim model
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Flexible funds can be allocated to either Programme X or Programme Y (Variable names: Rate
of Allocation of Collective Funds to Programme X and Rate of Allocation of Collective Funds
to Programme Y ) or for other federation allocation such as operational costs or investments
or even other programmes. The initial percentage splits are set fairly arbitrarily.
Assumptions related to income generation and funding types:
• It is assumed that fundraising countries are solely responsible for generating funds.
• Only two types of funds can be generated. The first is earmarked funds which
have a pre-determined allocation. The second is flexible/unrestricted funds which
can be allocated at the federation’s discretion.
• In reality, the above mentioned funds are usually neither completely earmarked
nor completely flexible however for the purposes of the model, these two categories
of funds will remain mutually exclusive.
• It is assumed that all funds generated in the emerging markets are flexible funds.
This assumes that, in emerging economies, international NGOs are entering into
fundraising activities and are generally exploring regular giving donations (indi-
vidual donations) that are more flexible in nature.
• External uncertainties such as economic or political volatility are taken into ac-
count through the income generating rate variables. A step change is included for
every 5 years, as this is the general time frame between potential political change
(i.e. elections) which can lead to a change in a government’s development funding
strategy.
6.4.2 Funds available for collective allocation
The three level variables represent the funds available for Programme X, Programme Y and
funds available for flexible allocation at any given point in time (Variable names: Cumulative
Funds Available - Programme X, Cumulative Funds Available - Programme Y and Total Funds
Available). Funds flow in and out of these level variables (stocks) on a monthly basis.
Not all flexible funds raised are available for allocation. A portion remains within the fundrais-
ing country office for their operational costs and other costs associated with fundraising. Most
international NGOs have set percentages and calculations that indicates how the flexible funds
are pooled.
This model applies a simplified “progressive tax” and assumes that mature markets raise the
majority of funds and therefore contribute a larger percentage of their funds. The contribution
percentages are initially set as two independent constants. These two percentages are applied
to the flexible funds generated by emerging markets and mature markets determines the inflow
into the middle level variable in this model, total funds available for collective allocation.
In Figure 6.7, the funds allocation and related variables are circled in red in the Vensim model.
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Figure 6.7: Funds allocation variables in the Vensim model
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Assumptions related to funds available for allocation:
• The model considers funding flows on a federation level and not at a specific
country or programme level.
• Not all flexible funds are available for collective allocation. A certain percentages
remains in the fundraising country offices to cover overheads or other fundraising
related costs.
• Earmarked funds are not available for allocation. All earmarked funds raised for
either Programme X or Programme Y directly are allocated accordingly.
6.4.3 Programme allocation:
As mentioned above, the three level variables indicate the amount of funds available for allo-
cation at any one point in time and are determined simply be subtracting the amount flowing
out with the amount flowing in. (Variable names: Cumulative Funds Available - Programme
X, Cumulative Funds Available - Programme Y and Total Funds Available)
The level variables determine the amount of funds available for allocation to Programme X and
Programme Y and what should be held in reserve (Variable names: Programme X Reserves
and Programme Y Reserves). The flexible funds available for collective allocation can be
allocated to either Programme X or Programme Y depending on the relative shortfalls within
each Programme (Variable names: Programme X Deficit and Programme Y Deficit).
For the purposes of this study, the features of Programme X and Programme Y are different.
Programme Y has the characteristics of a larger, more stable programmes whilst Programme
X has characteristics of smaller, more volatile programme.
In Figure 6.8, the programme allocation and related variables are circled in red in the Vensim
model.
Assumptions related to programme allocation:
• Flexible funds can be allocated to either programme if there is a shortfall between
funds and programme requirements, otherwise flexible funds are accumulated as
federation reserves.
• Two programmes have been chosen (as minimally illustrative) for this study to
explore, in a simple format, how flexible and earmarked funds interact and affect
performance against strategy. Further extensions of the model, to more than two
programmes can be considered in future studies.
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Figure 6.8: Programme allocation variables in the Vensim model
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6.4.4 Programme deficits:
Deficit variables for Programme X and Programme Y have been defined and they compare
the actual vs. desired reserves levels (Variable names: Programme X Deficit and Programme
Y Deficit). This is converted it into a normalising factor which then drives the programming
allocation proportion up or down in order to maintain an appropriate level of funds in reserve.
A desired reserves level has been set at two months, meaning that at any given time there should
be at least two months of funds available for allocation (Variable names: Desired Programme
Reserves).
Programme X and Y deficits are also used to inform how the flexible funds available should
be allocated based on short falls within each Programme. A series of decision variables are
used to compare the relative shortfalls for each Programme and allocates funds accordingly
up to a maximum amount. If there are no short falls, flexible funds are added to federation
reserves and available for federation operational allocation (Variable names: Alpha, Alpha max
andSufficient funds for Allocation to Programme X and Programme Y ).
6.4.5 Performance against strategy:
The performance against the global strategy provides an indication of the effectiveness of this
resource allocation model (Variable names: Performance against Strategy). This performance
has a delayed effect of total income of the federation suggesting that better performance, means
improved ability to raise funds and an increased likelihood of donors to donate to this INGO
over another.
In this model, the level of performance is represented as the effective utilisation of funds,
in other words, the extent to which programme funds available for allocation meets strategy
requirements and requirements for Programme X and Programme Y (Variable names: Per-
formance of Programme X and Performance of Programme Y ). The variables representing
strategy requirements and Programme X and Programme Y requirements follow an oscil-
lating/sinusoidal function, at this stage independent from any other variables in the model
(Variable names: Programme X Requirements and Programme Y Requirements).
The variable representing performance against strategy is normalised based on the difference
between allocation and requirements across the two Programmes.
The federations’ performance against its strategy has a delayed impact on the amount of total
funds within the federation, in other words the performance against the strategy influences
the federation’s ability to raise funds. “Good” performance against strategy returns a positive
number and, when applied to total federation funds, results in an overall increase. Similarly
“bad” performance against strategy returns a negative number, thereby reducing total feder-
ation funds (Variable names: Effect of Performance of Strategy on Total Income).
The diagram in Figure 6.9 is a high-level visual of how performance against strategy is incor-
porated into this model.
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Figure 6.9: Illustration of performance against strategy in the resource allocation model
Assumptions related to programme allocation:
• Performance against strategy is only influenced by the programme performance in
this model.
• Programme performance is based on the relative deficits or surplus of funds, based
on the difference between desired versus actual reserves. This is normalized in or-
der to compare relative deficits or surplus between Programme X and Programme.
Y.
• Performance against strategy is determined, conservatively, based on the weaker
of the two programmes.
• A delay of 24 months is included, as this is widely accepted as the time taken for
“medium” term outcomes to materialise in a development initiative.
6.4.6 Measures of success for the model:
The effectiveness of the framework, represented in this model, will attempt to be measured
against the following criteria, either explicitly modelled as outcome/goal variables in the model
or by making inferences through the behaviour and trends of funding flows:
• Performance against strategy - maximising the ability for the international NGO to meet
programme requirements.
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• Financial sustainability - monitoring of reserve levels from the federation and individual
programme perspective.
• Organisational agility - analysing the model’s response to external uncertainty.
These will be further explored through the validation process and management scenarios in
the chapters that follow.
6.5 Reflections on modelling process
A number of insights and lessons have been captured throughout the initial model development.
These are summarised below and should inform future studies in this area:
Complexity exists in even the simplest of models: The process of transforming even
one management concept into a set of variables is not a simple one-to-one relationship. One
concept is made up of number of variables with different information inputs and outputs, all
of which are ultimately represented algebraically.
Every arrow and variable has to contribute the model, a potentially daunting task when man-
agement strategies are often much broader and incorporation of an influencer without an
understanding of the nature of the influence is not sufficient in a rigorous modelling process.
Modelling is an iterative process: There is no “final” version of a model, it is an iterative
process and very much an interpretation of the modeller’s understanding of the real world
scenario being represented. A model can be tweaked and refined continuously, however it is
important to identify an appropriate point in time to put a stake in the ground, even if its not
perfect, and move on to analysis and interpretation of its behaviour and results.
Importance of stakeholder engagement during this process: A limitation of this study
is the diminished stakeholder engagement during the modelling process. As this process is
generally unfamiliar to management stakeholders, buy-in to the results and recommendations
without a good understanding of the model development may hinder stakeholders’ confidence
in taking action and making decisions based on this study.
The following chapter will discuss the validation process that was applied to this model, to
ensure that this model is fit for its purpose, structured logically and behaving reasonably.
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Chapter 7
Model Validation
7.1 Introduction
“Usefulness with respect to purpose.” [Forrester and Senge, 1980]
System dynamics has been critiqued as a modelling methodology because of the lack of em-
phasis on formal model validation processes [Barlas, 1996]. However, from a social sciences
perspective, model testing and validation plays a far greater role in system dynamics than in
other social sciences [Sterman, 2002]. System dynamics straddles qualitative system thinking
and the formal modelling realms [Sterman, 2002]. This means that establishing a model’s
validity or usefulness with respect to its purpose, requires multiple lenses. It requires both
qualitative and qualitative assessments on different data sets. Validation usually takes place
at a set point in time within the modelling process but it is also important to use validation
processes to continuously build stakeholders confidence from start to finish [Sterman, 2002].
The above does not provide a sneaky trap door through which to escape the rigours of testing
and validation, however it does provide room for a flexible interpretation of validation.
Barlas [1996] describes a three-stage model validation process which provides a frame within
which to build confidence in a system dynamics model’s structure and behaviour, thereby
building confidence in the results and recommendations of the model. This process has been
applied to the generic resource allocation model and the results are discussed in remainder of
this chapter.
Due to the limitations of first hand engagement with core stakeholders, this resource allocation
model in this study is one of interpretation and by no means the “absolute truth”. Rather, this
model provides a learning opportunity, illustrating how system dynamics thinking and simple
models can provide new insights into complex management challenges. It can also provide a
mechanism for identifying longer term “unintended” effects of management policies in order
to make more informed decisions in the future.
Since this model is a generic, simplified take on resource allocation mechanisms within inter-
national NGOs, validation is limited to theoretical comparisons, sense checking the model’s
logic against the cognitive maps in previous sections and light touch stress testing.
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It is important to note that statistical significance testing will not be employed in the validation
of this model. As is reasoned by Barlas [1996], the presence of correlated data and the notion
of rejecting a null hypothesis (invalidating the model) do not assist in the establishment of a
model’s usefulness with respect to its purpose [Barlas, 1996].
7.2 Model structure validation
“A valid system dynamics model embodies the theory about how a system actually works within
some respect.” [Barlas, 1996]
7.2.1 Overview
Barlas [1996] stresses the importance of the validity of a model’s internal structure. Con-
fidence in a model has to be established in the model’s logic before validity can be sought in
a model’s behaviour and functioning [Barlas, 1996]. Two types of tests are suggested when
validating a model’s structure, namely:
• Direct structure tests which studies the model’s equations separately and makes com-
parisons against available knowledge. This test does not require simulation but makes
comparisons against theoretical “accepted” literature or empirical data available from
the real system that is being modelled [Barlas, 1996].
• Structure oriented behaviour tests indirectly assess a model’s structure by applying
a set of “extreme” behaviours and gauging the model’s reaction in relation to the real life
system. Barlas [1996] tests include setting extreme values for certain model parameters
or identifying variables to which the model is sensitive and comparing these to behaviours
of the real system.
7.2.2 Application to this model
The model in this study is based on key features and functionalities of resources allocation
mechanisms in international NGOs. It provides a simplistic view on how funds are raised in
different markets, pooled for collective use and allocated based on a set of basic decisions rules.
It deals with two types of funds, earmarked funds that circumvent management decisions and
flexible funds which can be allocated based on federation requirements.
In an effort to create confidence in this model’s structure, the validation process refers back to
the rich picture diagrams, root definitions and cognitive maps that were developed based on
stakeholder interviews with a various individuals in the international NGO sector in Chapter
5.
The validation process also makes use of Causes and Uses Trees in Vensim. These trees can be
generated for each variable, depicting how the different variables are influenced by one another
in the model. These graphs will be used in the direct structure tests that follow.
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Direct structure tests: Comparisons with root definitions
The first root definition articulated in Chapter 5 mentions the fundamental importance of
collective pooling and allocation of resources in a federal structure and its ability to achieve
a global strategy. This is represented in the model through the level variable Total funds
available for collective allocation. The uses tree in Figure 7.1 depicts the collective allocation
level variable and the other variables that it influences.
Figure 7.1: Uses tree for Total Funds Available
The second root definition considers allocation from a programmatic perspective, looking at
the predictability of funds that flow through the allocation mechanism. The different reserves
variables within the model provides insights as to whether this model is providing this pre-
dictability and the extent to which programmes are affected by this. The causes tree in Figure
7.2 also shows how the cumulative funds, flexible and earmarked funds, as well as the level of
reserves, influences the programme’s performance.
Figure 7.2: Causes tree for Programme Y Performance
The third root definition considers allocation from a fundraising perspective. The model should
therefore reflect the uncertainties within fundraising environments. This is represented with the
two input variables (drivers) that are normally distributed with a step change occurring every
five years to mimic changes in political and financial environments in mature and emerging
markets. Figure 7.3 shows the two primary influences on income being a delayed strategy
performance and the effects of uncertain external fundraising environments.
Figure 7.3: Causes tree for Federation Income in Mature Markets
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Direct structure tests: Comparisons with cognitive maps
The most apparent feedback loop in the cognitive map in Chapter 5 is the effect of earmarked
funds in the resource allocation model.
Currently, allocation mechanisms and related management decisions are focussed on flexible
funds as management have a fundamental say over how these are allocated. This model
considers how allocations may change if earmarked funds are considered and flexible funds
are used as a balancing mechanism. This curbs the effect of the reinforcing feedback loop
that is apparent in the cognitive map demonstrating that those country offices that benefit
from earmarked funds, gain more experience in handling the requirements that are attached
to earmarked funds and thus are more likely to be successful in receiving such funds in the
future therefore causing more saturated funds in fewer country offices.
This balancing effect is incorporated into the model through a series of decision rules which
proportionally allocate collective resources based on the comparable size of each programme’s
deficit. The causes tree in Figure 7.4 depicts the variables that determine funds flowing into
Programme Y. This figure shows how the earmarked funds are augmented by the flexible funds
through collective allocation.
Figure 7.4: Causes tree for Inflow of Funds into Programme Y
The incorporation of flexible funds as a balancing mechanism was a specific question that arose
during the stakeholder engagement sessions, as the degree to which this currently happens
varies greatly.Therefore, stakeholders felt that the analysis of how this would (or would not)
affect allocation decisions would be of interest. The behaviour of this mechanism is further
explored in the behavioural tests that follow.
Structure oriented behaviour tests: Sensitivity and extreme value analysis
When applying extreme values to the variables that generate funds, the model reacts sensibly.
Figure 7.5 shows how the increased volatility of income is similarly reflected in the allocation
of funds to Programme Y. This sensitivity is in line with stakeholders’ feedback in terms of
the limitations of current resource allocation mechanisms. The magnitudes of the steps in
the extreme value run for both the total federation income and total programme allocation
variables are directly proportional in magnitude to the to the step changes in the income
generating variables (random normal income rate variables). This is as expected as, in practice,
the fundraising environments and any shocks or uncertainties associated with funds generation
generally drives the behaviour of resource allocation mechanisms. Management decisions are
required to put in place policies that will mitigate the impact on programme allocation, for
example, reserve policies.
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Figure 7.5: Model behaviour of federation income vs. programme allocation
Similarly, when applying extreme values to programme requirements, the model responds
appropriately. In this instance, the requirements for Programme Y were increased by a factor
of 4. This results in a steady downward trend for the cumulative funds available for Programme
Y, as is evident in the top graph in Figure 7.6. The middle and bottom graphs in Figure 7.6
depict the inflow and outflow of programme funds respectively. The behaviour of the inflows
(middle graph in Figure 7.6) largely fluctuate between 50 and 100, whilst the behaviour of
the outflows (bottom graph in Figure 7.6) fluctuate between 800 and 900 which is why the
cumulative funds available show such a steep downward trend, resulting in the programme
running “into the red” fairly quickly.
Note that the model continues to run even although the cumulative funds available for the
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programme run into the negative fairly quickly (top graph in Figure 7.6) which is why the
inflows and outflows have constant fluctuations. In reality, a programme in this situation
would not be left to its own devices and management intervention would be required to either
find additional funds, reduce the scope of the programme or, in some cases, stop the programme
altogether. Modelling the management response to such a programme running at a loss could
be explored in future studies.
This second extreme value analyses supports the logic behind the collective allocation decision
rules that are applied when a programme has insufficient earmarked funds. Although simple,
these decision rules for allocation of collective resources provide an indication of how such a
“balancing” mechanism may influence the behaviour of the overall model.
The above two extreme value analyses represent the major independent drivers in this model
that are completely out of management control. Analyses of the other peripheral driver vari-
ables such as desired reserve levels, funding mix determinants and contribution percentages are
explored in more detail in the next chapter through management scenarios as they represent
potential levers of change within the model.
7.3 Model behaviour validation
“The right output for the right reasons.” [Sterman, 2002]
7.3.1 Overview
Once the validity of a model’s structure has been established, further assessments can be made
on the model’s behaviours to establish the model’s accuracy in reproducing the real system’s
core behaviours [Barlas, 1996]. It is important to focus on the patterns of how different
variables behave rather than specific points or values [Barlas, 1996]. As mentioned earlier,
statistical tests do not always yield relevant information when attempting to establish validity
in highly dynamic models with high levels of correlating data. Graphic representation for
comparative purposes with real systems or accepted knowledge is seen to be an acceptable
mode of validation in this instance [Barlas, 1996].
7.3.2 Application to this model
The ultimate goal for the resource allocation model, according to stakeholder feedback, is to
maximise performance against strategy. It is therefore important to analyse the behaviour of
this variable in the initial model. The causes tree for this variable in Figure 7.7 shows how the
combination of resource allocation variables for both programmes as well as the programme re-
quirements influence performance against strategy. Performance against strategy in this model
is simply measured as the degree to which programme requirements are met with earmarked
and allocated resources.
The behaviour of the programme performance and the strategy performance variables are pri-
marily driven by programme requirements and the level of incoming funds in this simplified
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Figure 7.6: Model behaviour of Allocation of Collective Funds between Programmes
model. As such, from a qualitative management perspective, one would expect that the perfor-
mance related variables would respond positively to higher levels of incoming funds, in other
words, increased funds result in increased performance. On the other hand, with all other vari-
ables remaining the same, one would expect that higher programme requirements that cannot
be met by the current funds available, would result in decreased performance. These qualita-
tive presumptions were simulated in the initial model to test whether the model’s results are
comparable in four different runs.
Note:
• Performance against strategy, in this instance, is presented somewhat conservatively
equating to the weakest programme performance between Programme X and Programme
Y.
• The x -axes in Figures 7.8 and 7.9 represent the relative deficits/surplus of funds, based
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Figure 7.7: Causes and Uses trees for Performance against Strategy
on the difference between desired versus actual reserves. This is normalized in order to
compare relative deficits or surplus between Programme X and Programme Y. Perfor-
mance against strategy is determined, conservatively, based on the weaker of the two
programmes.
Run A - The impact of increased funds with high programme requirements on
performance variables:
The funds generating variables were increased until there was a behaviour change evident in
the performance related variables. This meant that the funds generated in mature markets
variable was increased by a factor 10 and the programme requirement were increased by a
factor of 4. The resulting behaviour in the performance variables is depicted the top graph
in Figure 7.8, showing that all three performance variables (the two programme performance
variables and the overall performance against strategy variable) repeatedly under-perform.
The reason for this is the programme requirements have been set so high in this run that they
are never met and the resulting behaviour of the performance variables are thus always negative
(because the requirements are always larger than the funds available for each programme).
Furthermore, due to the assumed characteristics that Programme Y ’s requirements are much
higher than that of Programme X (as described in Section 6.4.3), this results in a consistently
lower performance for Programme Y. Since the overall performance against strategy is deter-
mined (conservatively) by the lowest performing programme, this means that at any point in
time, performance against strategy is equal to that of Programme Y ’s performance. In fact,
you cannot see Programme Y ’s behaviour (green line) at all in the top graph of Figure 7.8 as
it is overlaid by the overall performance against strategy behaviour (blue line).
Run B - The impact of increased funds with low programme requirements on
performance variables:
In this run, the programme requirement variables were reset to their initial lower values (i.e.
reduced by a factor of 4) whilst the funds generation variables remained high. As expected,
the resulting behaviour in the performance variables, depicted in the bottom graph in Figure
7.8 quickly reaches “optimal performance” as programme requirements are repeatedly met due
to the increase magnitude of available funds.
Run C - The impact of decreased funds with high programme requirements on
performance variables:
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In Run C, the funds generation variables are set back to their original values, (i.e. reduced by
a factor of 10) whilst the programme requirements are increased by a factor of 4. The resulting
behaviour of the performance variables, depicted in the top graph in Figure 7.9, shows that
the decreased funds coupled with the higher programme requirements result in decreasing
programme and strategy performance. This is as expected as there are less funds available
to meet programme requirements and thus the year-on-year shortfalls culminate in decreasing
performance over time.
Similarly to Run A, due to the assumed characteristics that Programme Y ’s requirements are
much higher than that of Programme X (as described in Section 6.4.3), this results in a con-
sistently lower performance for Programme Y. Since the overall performance against strategy
is determined (conservatively) by the lowest performing programme, this means that at any
point in time, performance against strategy is equal to that of Programme Y ’s performance.
In fact, you cannot see Programme Y ’s behaviour (green line) at all in the top graph of Figure
7.8 as it is overlaid by the overall performance against strategy behaviour (blue line).
Figure 7.8: Behaviour of Performance variables in Run A and Run B
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Run D - The impact of decreased funds with low programme requirements on
performance variables:
In the final run, the funds generation variables are kept at their original values, (i.e. reduced by
a factor of 10) and the programme requirements are also set back to their original values (i.e.
reduced by a factor of 4). The resulting behaviour of the performance variables is depicted in
the bottom graph in Figure 7.9. This figure shows that the decreased funds coupled with the
lower programme requirements result in an increased programme and strategy performance,
reaching “optimal performance” after 20 months which is as expected as the available funds
are sufficient to meet the programme requirements.
The above combinations validate the core behaviours of this simplified resource allocation
model as they reinforce management’s expectations of the flow of funds and the impact on the
performance variables. This analysis is further explored through the management scenarios in
the next chapter.
Figure 7.9: Behaviour of Performance variables in Run C and Run D
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7.4 Reflections
The model validation tests conducted in this chapter, although light touch, show that this
resource allocation model’s structure is largely representative of the core components of re-
source allocation mechanisms as described by stakeholders during the various interviews and
engagements. For example, the root definitions that were developed in Chapter 5, presenting
stakeholder feedback through three core lenses (programmatic, fundraising and federation) are
reflected in the model’s structure.
The model is also reflective (in a simplified manner) of the current external and organisational
contexts that were revealed through the cognitive mapping exercise, for example, in the incor-
poration of uncertainty in the funds in funds generation and the allowance for management
policies such as reserves.
Finally, this model allows for one expansion, namely the incorporation of earmarked funds,
as a decision making criterion, into the resource allocation process. A simplified decision rule
to allocate funds according to relative shortfall of funds was included in the model. The
sensitivity and extreme value analysis showed that the flexible funds are allocated accordingly
when programme requirements are varied. This was an explicit outcome of the stakeholder
engagement processes and its incorporation may generate insights as to how such a model
would deal with these variables in real life.
It is worth repeating that the purpose of this model and this study is to learn about how
resource allocation mechanisms, simplified as it may be, act in a systems dynamic environment
and this could potentially reveal new insights in management decisions in relation to this. As
such, the above validation is considered satisfactory in this instance, but additional tests and
increased engagement with a wider subset of stakeholders should be considered if any of the
results or insights be practically incorporated into INGOs or other organisations:
For example, the root definitions and cognitive map should be workshopped with the INGO’s
full management team, including representation from diverse country offices (smaller vs. larger
offices with different funding and programming mixes etc.). In addition, a financial represen-
tative, or an individual(s) with deep knowledge of the INGO’s financial position, should be
included in the modelling and validation processes to ensure that a more detailed model’s
structure and behaviour is an adequate representation of their specific resource allocation re-
ality in relation to the INGO’s historical financial and fundraising data. Once this model
is deemed sufficiently “valid” for management decision making, more substantive stakeholder
engagement is required to gain buy-in into the model so that resulting changes are accepted
and owned within the INGO, therefore establishing the model’s credibility with stakeholders
is a necessity.
In the chapter that follows, a series of management scenarios will be explored, building on the
initial model, outlined in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 8
Management Scenarios
8.1 Introduction
With the generic resource allocation model validated for the purposes of this study, three
management scenarios are simulated. The generic model, as outlined in Chapter 6, is used as
a “base model” and the amendments of each scenario are applied, simulated and analysed.
For this study, the term “scenario” is loosely used to refer to the revised model with amend-
ments based on the characteristics of the scenario. This revised model is simulated and the
resulting behaviour analysed to evaluate differences, translating these into insights that may
be relevant from a international NGO management perspective.
This chapter begins by outlining the scenario selection rationale, detailing why certain sce-
narios are of interest in this specific study and highlights the model amendments required for
simulating each scenario. The remainder of the chapter explores each scenario, the specific
amendments to the model’s structure and the resulting behaviours and implications from a
management perspective.
It is important to note up front that the analyses that follows provide “snapshots” of how the
model behaviour’s changes based on discrete amendments. These scenarios/amendments are
not the only ones, nor even the best ones to consider. However, they attempt to provide illus-
trative investigations given real life resource allocation challenges as described by stakeholder,
demonstrating how system dynamics modelling can help management, rather than solving a
specific management problem.
A more exhaustive investigation, for example considering combinations of scenarios and ap-
plying different functions to various variables within the model are beyond the scope of this
study and could be considered in future studies.
8.2 Overview and scenario selection rationale
Numerous perspectives and scenarios can potentially be considered when analysing this re-
source allocation model.
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Core model compo-
nents
Real world represen-
tation
Model amendments Simulation analysis
1. Income generating
variables
Generates income in two
markets - mature and
emerging markets; in-
cludes volatility to illus-
trate external uncertain-
ties
Increase or decrease vari-
ability in current vari-
ables; change the function
type of an income gener-
ating variable
The extent to which the
model is responsive to
this volatility will test the
robustness and agility of
the mechanism
2. Percentage allocation
parameters
Determines the amount
of funds that can be col-
lectively allocated; de-
termines the percentage
split of flexible vs. ear-
marked funds
Increase or decrease allo-
cation percentages; vary
the percentage splits be-
tween earmarked and
flexible funds
These adjustments will
test the affordability of
the model and the ex-
tent to which different
combinations of flexi-
ble funds vs. earmarked
funds impact the model’s
performance
3. Decision rules that
govern collective alloca-
tion of flexible funds
Represents one very sim-
ple management rule to
allocate collective funds
Current decision rules
based on the relative pro-
gramme requirements;
additional variables can
be added to further in-
fluence the allocation of
flexible funds, for exam-
ple, strategic investments
variables
Consider the effect of
additional influencing
factors to see whether
collective allocation as
a balancing mechanisms
remains effective
4. Reserves and deficit
variables (programme
level and federation level)
A proxy for financial
sustainability, with two
to three months reserves
considered optimal
Reserve levels remain
unchanged; model exten-
sions can consider how
excess reserves can be
utilised or collectively
allocated
No change for simula-
tions, reserve levels are
treated as an indicator
of financial sustainability
rather than a manage-
ment lever for change
5. Programme require-
ments
Determines the extent to
which funds are allocated
to different programmes
within the resource allo-
cation framework; based
on needs/demands
Incorporate influenc-
ing factors based on the
resource allocation frame-
work e.g. historical allo-
cations patterns
No change for simula-
tions; in future this can
provide insights into how
fundraising and/or other
organisational strategies
can unduly influence allo-
cation
6. Performance against
strategy
A proxy for the effec-
tiveness of the allocation
framework; compares pro-
gramme requirements and
programme funds avail-
able; this variable also
influences (with a delay)
the ability to raise future
funds
Performance against
strategy remains un-
changed; serves as a per-
formance indicator when
the different scenarios are
investigated
No change for simula-
tions; however the chang-
ing behaviour of this
variable will be observed
throughout the simula-
tion process
Table 8.1: Summary of potential model amendments for simulation
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Table 8.1 aims to summarise the various different scenarios and amendments that can be
explored, based on stakeholder feedback and the management experiences of the author. The
table is categorised according to six core components that constitute the generic model in
Chapter 6. Each of these core components (sets of parameters) are explored, investigating the
types of simulations that can potentially be applied and the anticipated model amendments
required to generate the respective scenarios.
Analysing 8.1 and considering stakeholders’ feedback and their initial interests in such a mod-
elling process, the first three line items in the table will be formulated into scenarios for this
study. The remaining three, included for completeness, can be considered in future studies.
Each of these different scenarios, not to mention combinations of scenarios, can and should
be considered in future analyses. However, for the purposes of this study, the first three line
items in Table 8.1 are considered sufficient for further investigation in this dissertation. After
all, the purpose of dissertation is to examine the feasibility of the system dynamics modelling
approach. The features of the first three scenarios in Table 8.1 represent the key concerns
of stakeholders and will be used to illustrate how such a modelling technique may be useful
in providing example insights. However, a more thorough analysis would be required in the
future should an INGO management team wish to practically apply any recommendations to
their organisational contexts.
The remainder of this chapter explores the first three scenarios, as mentioned above, in Table
8.1 through individual simulation and interpretation of results. The purpose of which is to
investigate the different types of decisions that would trigger different behaviours in different
variables and what combinations of parameters would yield optimal (or at least improved)
model behaviour based on a set of management criteria discussed during stakeholder engage-
ments.
The three scenarios that are explored in this study consider the following variations:
Management scenarios:
1. Volatility of income generated versus predictability of income available for alloca-
tion
2. Varying proportions between flexible funds versus earmarked and the effect on
fundraising contribution percentages
3. Changing the decision rules on how flexible funds are allocated and its effect on
balancing allocation between Programme X and Programme Y
Below are two Figures 8.1 and 8.2 that show which areas of the model will be manipulated in
each scenario.
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Figure 8.1: Simulation focus areas
Figure 8.2: Simulation focus areas cont.
The experiments and adjustments to the model will be considered from the following aspects:
• Performance against strategy, an explicit variable in model
• Financial sustainability, monitoring behaviour of reserves variables
• Organisational agility, monitoring how long it takes for the mechanism to balance after
an external shock
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8.3 Scenario One
Volatility of income generated vis-a´-vis predictability of income available for allo-
cation
The concept of volatility has both positive and negative connotations, depending on context,
resource availability, organisational agility and personal preference. However, for the purposes
of this scenario, in the context of generating funds for NGOs, increased volatility is undesirable.
Income volatility was a consistent concern from the stakeholders who contributed to this study.
This is substantiated by [Hudson, 2015] who explores the link between aid volatility and aid
effectiveness and how unexpected deficits can cause potential imbalance and overcorrection.
Since this model is primarily concerned with the effectiveness of resource allocation, it therefore
seems acceptable to surmise that higher volatility in income would have a negative effect on the
ability to meet programme requirements, negatively impacting the overall performance against
strategy.
The volatility that is experienced in this context, is typically as a result of external uncertainty
in fundraising environments. According to the ActionAid and Greenpeace annual reports be-
tween 2014 - 2016 [Greenpeace, 2017] [ActionAid, 2017], political and economic climates in the
traditional fundraising countries in Europe, combined with diversification strategies (fundrais-
ing investment in emerging markets) has resulted in slower income growth as well as sharp
disruptions due to exchange rate volatility. This has an impact on programme implementa-
tion, hindering the ability for programmes to accurately plan and manage projects.
8.3.1 Model Amendments
The above motivation is translated into specific model amendments and these are detailed in
Table 8.2.
Variable Name Amendment Explanation
Random rate (mature
markets)
Incremental increases
of the mature markets
volatility by doubling the
variance of the underly-
ing normal distribution
Explore the extent to which incremental increases
in volatility affect performance against strategy
Income rate (emerging
markets)
Replace uniform function
with a logistics curve
which will determine the
mean, average, income
rate for this variable
Explore the effect of a non-linear income rate on
allocation behaviour
Income rate (mature mar-
kets)
Vary the size and timing
of the step change, which
determines the average
size of income, when gen-
erating the the income
rate in mature markets
Exploring the effect of changing the magnitude and
timing of the external “shocks” in fundraising con-
texts
Table 8.2: Scenario 1: Model amendments for increased income volatility
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As previously mentioned, predictability of income for programme implementation is crucial.
This scenario, therefore, aims to explore the extent the pooling and balancing mechanism in
the model absorbs and/or distributes the disruptions and volatility in order to minimise the
effect on programme implementation.
It is important to note that the degree to which variables are increased or decreased have been
chosen fairly arbitrarily, it is the relative model behaviour that is of most interest and not the
specific values of constants as this is a hypothetical model.
8.3.2 Simulation Results
When increasing the volatility of the model with the above model amendments the resulting
behaviour of key variables were as follows:
Increased volatility of income generated in mature markets:
The two graphs in Figure 8.3 compare the effect of the incremental increase (by a factor of 2)
in the standard deviation of the random normal function that is used to generate income. The
top graph in Figure 8.3 depicts the behaviour of income in mature markets. The mean for this
function is determined by the step function that makes a random change every 12 months,
this determines the predominant behaviour. The three simulation runs show a proportional
increase in variations with Run 1, with the lowest standard deviation, having the smoothest
behaviour whilst Run 3, with the higher standard deviation (four times that of Run 1), having
a more volatile behaviour.
The effect of these changes on performance against strategy is seen in the second graph in
Figure 8.3. It is evident from this graph that the behaviour is primarily responsive to the
mean behaviour of the income variable. The increase in standard deviation has minimal effect
on performance against strategy in the first 24 months. Towards the end of the simulation,
where the mean income decreases, the higher standard deviation does have a slight negative
effect on performance against strategy.
When considering intermediate variables such as the federation and programme deficits, in-
creasing the volatility of income generated in mature markets did have an effect. This is
evident in the two graphs in 8.4. However through the allocation mechanism, this effect was
reduced as is evident when looking at the project deficit levels. The federation deficit is more
responsive when the volatility results in a sharp decrease in income. This results in a sharp
drop in federation deficit levels. These sharp drops are not as apparent in the Programme Y
deficits.
This can potentially be attributed to the effectiveness of the allocation mechanism in balancing
out this volatility with project requirements. However, the behaviour of the programme deficit
variable is more responsive to the mean income behaviour. This will be further explored when
the parameters for the mean income for mature markets is varied in another simulation.
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Figure 8.3: Effect of increased income volatility on performance against strategy
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Figure 8.4: Effect of increased income volatility on Federation and Programme deficit levels
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Increased growth of income generated in emerging markets:
A logistics curve is applied to income generated emerging markets with three simulation runs
depicting a progressively increased gradient. These changes are directly reflected in magnitude
and timing when considering the cumulative funds available for Programme X in Figure 8.5.
This is largely due to the fact that the income generated in emerging markets is flexible and
Programme X does not attract a large amount of earmarked funds. This means that the
cumulative funds for Programme X mimics the behaviour of flexible income generated.
Figure 8.5: Effect of non-linear income rate on programme funds
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Varied mean for income generated in mature markets:
The mean used in the random normal function to generate income in mature markets is based
on step function that moves up or down every 24 months. In this scenario, the magnitude and
timing are adjusted to create three different behaviours. Figure 8.6 shows the behaviour of
the function with its initial parameter settings in run 1 (green). The second run (red) shows
a lengthier timing between step changes and the step changes have smaller magnitude, which
creates “smoother” behaviour. The third run (blue) has more frequent changes with a larger
magnitude.
Figure 8.6: Effect of varied mean of income generated in mature markets
The effect of these changes is analysed through the behaviour of programme cumulative funds
and programme reserves depicted in figure 8.7. The first graph in this figure shows the effect of
the change in mean income on cumulative funds available for Programme X. The “smoother”
behaviour has a negative effect on the amount of cumulative funds, this effect gradually in-
creases over time. Even although the difference in means between months 70 and 90 for run 1
and run 2 are similar, the effect on the cumulative funds between the same time period shows
an increasing difference.
In the second graph in Figure 8.7 the programme reserves also seem to be more sensitive to
the smoother income behaviour with an increased frequency of sharp drops in reserves. Even
although the change in mean is more frequent and higher in magnitude in run 3, the allocation
mechanism seems to be able to take advantage of the higher mean with programme reserves
only being affected towards the end of the time period.
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Figure 8.7: Effect of varied mean on programme funds and reserves
Reflection on Scenario 1:
This first scenario looks to explore how income volatility and different types of income distri-
butions impacts the predictability of income at programmatic level. For INGO management,
this is critical from a programme planning perspective, especially in cases where programmes
run over multiple years. System dynamics provides an opportunity for INGO managers to
simulate the effects of such volatility and to test out different policies and parameters that
could reduce the impact of programmatic and strategic performance over the long term.
Even a simple system dynamics model such as this can generate numerous management in-
sights, identifying triggers and trends to assist INGO management when they structure their
resource planning and allocation processes, or other management mechanisms.
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For example, in this scenario, the balancing mechanism in the resource allocation model seems
to moderate the additional changes and volatility in the income generating variables. The fed-
eration bears the brunt of the volatility and this limits the knock on effect on programmes and
projects, providing more predictability at the programme level. This is particularly apparent
in Figure 8.4 where the volatility of the programmatic deficits is attenuated compared to that
of the federation deficits. Although this is likely to be desirable, affording programmes more
predictability in income, the effect of this at federation level (top graph in Figure 8.4 may also
need to be compensated to avoid the sharp drops in reserves, with an increasing frequency
over time. Such insights are important as it indicates that a change in strategy may be needed
between 40 and 50 months (3 to 4 years) in relation to resource planning and allocation.
Another point for consideration in this scenario could be in relation to performance against
strategy. In this instance, performance against strategy responds proportionally to the changes
in the mean of the income generating variables, however the variance of the income generating
variables has almost no effect. It is only when the volatility directly influences the the magnitude
of funds available, in other words results in a step change in the mean, that the behaviour of the
performance variables responds as was evident in Figure 8.3. This type of an insight could be,
for example, used to influence funding diversification strategies to minimise the over-reliance
of funds in one country or one type of of fundraising environment.
As was described in Secton 2.4, the development landscape is becoming increasingly complex
and INGOs, as key players, need to be able to adapt their strategies and structures in response
to this. Modelling approaches such as system dynamics could prove extremely helpful in
exploring different options for change whilst minimising disruption of their current programmes.
It is worth repeating that these are simple illustrations of the power of system dynamics when
applied in this context. Future studies could consider incorporating additional influence from
other variables (e.g. federation deficits) to extend this scenario and test the extent this to
which volatility is absorbed in the model.
8.4 Scenario Two
The types of funds that international NGOs raise are often closely linked to their strategy and
identity. Securing flexible funds is generally preferred as this allows an organisation to allocate
funds in line with their own strategies rather allocation based on donor or other external
strategies. However, these types of funds tend to be in smaller amounts, received by individual
givers. Earmarked funds, especially in the form of grants, are generally larger and for specific
programmes. A set of criteria is used to structure how the funds can be spent, in terms of
which programmes and also types of activities within a programme.
In this scenario, the funding mix will be varied, to explore the effect of certain combinations
on performance against strategy and the federation reserves. Three combinations will be con-
sidered, firstly predominantly earmarked funds, secondly predominantly flexible funds, thirdly
an equal mix of earmarked and flexible funds.
This scenario will also consider the effect of a different mix funding types on the collective
contribution percentages. The generic model makes the assumption that only flexible funds
can be pooled as earmarked funds are preallocated. Furthermore, the generic model, assumes
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that there is one fixed contribution percentage applied across all flexible funds (refer to Section
6.4.2). If the contribution percentage is set too high, this could incentivise fundraising countries
to prioritise raising earmarked funds, on which no contribution percentage is applied. This
could mean that the model would not be affordable to fundraising countries and would result
in a limited ability for the federation to have flexible funds for strategic investment or other
priorities.
This scenario will consider the effect of the three different funding mixes and will look at the
combination of 3 different contribution percentages (high, medium, low) applied to flexible
funds and the effect of this on performance against strategy.
8.4.1 Model Amendments
Based on the above rationale, specific amendments which have been incorporated into the
generic model are described in Table 8.3. This scenario aims to explore the effect of varying
proportions of flexible funds and earmarked funds on total federation contributions and if
contribution percentages should be adjusted to maintain acceptable federation reserve levels.
Table 8.3: Model amendments for varying types of funds
Variable Name Amendment Explanation
Mature markets percent-
age split earmarked vs
flexible funds
Three combinations are
considered; firstly 80 per-
cent earmarked funds and
20 percent flexible funds ;
secondly 80 percent flexi-
ble funds and 20 percent
earmarked funds; thirdly
an equal mix, 50 percent,
for both types of funds
Exploring the effect of the three different funding
mixes on performance against strategy and federa-
tion income levels
Variations in contribution
percentages for global al-
location (refer to Section
6.4.2)
Varying the contribution
percentages (high - 80
percent, medium - 50 per-
cent and low - 20 percent)
that is applied to the flex-
ible funds
Exploring the combined effect of the different con-
tribution percentages and the different funding
mixes on income levels and performance against
strategy
It is important to note that the degree to which variables are increased or decreased are set
fairly arbitrarily. It is the model behaviour that is of most interest and not the specific values
of constants as this is a hypothetical model.
91
CHAPTER 8. MANAGEMENT SCENARIOS
8.4.2 Simulation Results
When varying the funding mix and contribution percentages of the model with the above model
amendments the resulting behaviour of key variables were as follows:
Effect on federation income:
The three simulation runs represent three different funding mixes. Run 1 reflects an 80 percent
flexible funding mix, Run 2 has a balanced mix of 50 percent flexible funds and 50 percent
earmarked funds and Run 3 has an 80 percent earmarked funding mix.
Figure 8.8: Effect of varied funding mixes on total funds available for collective allocation
As is expected, the increase in proportion of earmarked funding in the federation funding mix
does reduce the overall funds available for collected allocation as is evident in the in Run 3
in blue Figure 8.8. The overall behaviour of total funds available, however, is still primarily
responsive to the behaviour of the incoming generating variables. This is evident in the the
two “peaks” at month 10 and month 40 that are a direct result of increase in overall income
generated. As is expected, a higher proportion of flexible funds (Run 1 in green in Figure 8.8)
does result in more funds available for collective allocation, and the increased magnitude is
proportional to the percentage increase of flexible funds vs. earmarked funds.
This behaviour is not as evident when considering the federation deficit. Run 3 in blue in
Figure 8.9 shows that the a predominantly earmarked funding mix results in more resilient
reserve levels in the longer term.
Although all three runs show similar behaviour, a predominantly flexible funding mix (Run
1 in green in Figure 8.9 has the largest magnitude of negative reserves after month 50. This
could mean that long term fundraising strategies should be revised at least every 5 years if an
organisation raises mostly flexible funds.
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Figure 8.9: Effect of varied funding mixes on federation reserve levels
Effect of increased earmarked funding on balancing mechanism:
Although the increase in earmarked funds has a noticeable effect on funds available for collective
allocation as seen in 8.9, this effect seems to dissipate as funds are subsequently allocated
to the different programmes. Once earmarked funds are combined with the flexible funds
and allocated to a programme, the difference in reserve levels, and ultimately programme
performance is reduced. This is particularly evident when considering fund allocation and
performance of Programme X as is evident in 8.10.
The first graph in Figure 8.10 shows that the increase in flexible funds has an initial negative
effect on the performance of Programme X over the first 24 months. The relative magnitude of
the differences between the three runs are also initially not equal - the difference in magnitude
between Run 1 and Run 2 is greater than that of Run 2 and Run three in the first graph in
Figure 8.10. This is potentially due to the fact that Programme X has a smaller, more volatile
programme requirements compared to that of Programme Y and it may be more difficult to
“compete” with Programme Y for flexible funds allocation. This, however, dissipates over
time, and the changes reach an equilibrium. In this simulation, all other things being equal,
the funding mix does not seem to impact programme performance over the long term.
The second graph in Figure 8.10 shows that the different funding mixes also has an effect the
performance against strategy with a predominantly flexible funding mix consistently resulting
in better performance against strategy. However, the overall behaviour of the performance
against strategy variable is the same across all three runs. Further model extensions should
consider how an increased number of programmes or incorporating additional influencing vari-
ables into performance against strategy would affect this behaviour.
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Figure 8.10: Effect of varied funding mixes on programme performance and strategy perfor-
mance
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Effect of variations of the contribution percentage on performance against strategy:
Three different contribution percentages were simulated, these are depicted graphically in
Figure 8.11. The first run shows the effect of a low contribution percentage of 20 percent,
the second the effect of a medium contribution percentage (50 percent) and the third run
shows the effect of a high contribution of 80 percent. These contribution percentages have an
expected effect on total funds available for collective allocation, with higher funds available for
collective allocation as a result of a higher contribution (Run 3 in blue in Figure 8.11). Again,
the predominant behaviour of the overall graph mimics the behaviour of the income generating
variables which show the two peaks in the beginning and then smooths out towards the end
as seen in the first graph in Figure 8.11. This first graph shows that the relative magnitude of
the different runs are exacerbated with higher amounts of funds, as is evident in the “peak”
between months 30 and 60. The relative difference in magntitude between Run 1 and Run 2
is lower than between Run 2 and Run 3 during this period. This seems sensible as a higher
amount of funds is compounded with a higher contribution percentage resulting an increased
total amount of funds for allocation.
The result of the different contribution percentages on performance against strategy is slightly
different. The different contribution percentages have no effect on the performance against
strategy for the first 22 months, after which the lowest contribution percentage reduces perfor-
mance from month 22 until month 55, as is evident in the second graph in Figure 8.11. This
behaviour changes as month 60 when the income reduces which results in a constant decline of
performance against strategy. The higher contribution percentage (Run 3 in blue) does allow
for a “grace period”, buffering the effect of declining income on performance against strategy
by 5 months and 15 months compared to a medium (Run 2 in red) and low (Run 1 in green)
contribution percentage respectively. This is important for NGO management as it allows for
changes to be made in fundraising strategies if income declines in a specific market, however
the time lags (between 5 and 15 months) are fairly short to invest in new markets, or other
income generating strategies and “early warning” mechanisms should be put in place to ensure
minimal impact on performance against strategy.
Reflection on Scenario 2:
The type of funds raised by INGOs is as important as the size of funds raised as it is closely
linked with an INGO’s approach to programming. An over-reliance on earmarked funds may
result in undue influence over an INGO’s resource allocation decisions and undermine an INGOs
ability to respond to its primary constituents. In terms of the INGOs engaged in this study,
generally flexible funds are preferred over earmarked funds for this very reason.
This scenario tested the effect of progressively increasing the percentage of flexible funds and,
although this did result in additional funds available for collective allocation, the effect on
long term reserves needs to be further interrogated to ensure that it does not negatively affect
the long term sustainability of the organisation. This is an important consideration for INGO
management as competition for donors is a daily reality both between INGOs themselves and
with other development actors such as social movements or “pop-up” organisations that raise
funds for a specific cause and then may dis-ban [Swindoll, 2015]. This, coupled with new
profiles of individual supporters (who generally donate flexible funds) plus technology means
that flexible funds can be generated at a click of a button as opposed to fundraisers going
door-to-door. This type of fundraising may lend itself to emergency/reactive fundraising for
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a specific cause, augmenting core funding that allows an organisation to quickly respond to
changes in contexts. However, there may not be the same sense of longevity of such supporters
and flexible donations which is an important factor for long term sustainability.
When considering performance against strategy in this scenario, the behaviour of this variable
remains largely at the mercy of the income generating variables with only minor changes in
magnitude when the funding mix and contribution percentages were varied (Figures 8.10 and
8.11). Although the performance variable in this simplified model has a delayed effect on the
magnitude of funds raised, it does not influence the type of funds raised which could explain
the lack of responsiveness across the different runs in this scenario.
Exploring feedback loops in relation to supporter engagement, public perceptions of INGOs
and the political climate that influences the boundaries of earmarked funding would likely add
more richness to this scenario.
Further model extensions should consider the incorporation of influences such as public per-
ception on the ability to raise flexible funds or the impact of federation reserves on strategy to
further test the extent to which these can be levers of change for INGO management.
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Figure 8.11: Effect of varied contribution percentage on performance against strategy
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8.5 Scenario Three
The final scenario that is explored is this study considers the balancing mechanism in this
allocation model. Based on stakeholder feedback, a resource allocation mechanism in an in-
ternational NGO should enable the organisation to be financially sustainable and to enable
equitable distribution of income based on mutually agreed policies and criteria. This is im-
portant to ensure that funds are not saturated in a few country offices, and that all country
offices can meaningfully contribute to the organisation. As such, this scenario will look at two
aspects of financial sustainability within the resource allocation model.
The first aspect that is considered, is that of including an additional variable to which funds are
allocated for fundraising investment. These flexible funds are initially kept aside for fundraising
investment and are not allocated to Programme X nor Programme Y. These funds are used
to increase the organisation’s propensity to fundraise in the future. The simulations will look
at the behaviour of the programme performance and performance against strategy over time
to see what effect this additional variable will have on the model.
The second aspect that will be considered in this scenario will be the variation of the desired
reserves levels. Some international NGOs have a set number of months of income that need
to be kept in reserve in case of unexpected events. Considering the fact that the resource
allocation model is still largely responsive to the behaviour of the income generating variables,
to what extent can an increased reserve level increase the ability for the model to be robust
against external shocks? And what is the effect on current, short term performance against
strategy. These two sets of simulations and their results are explored below.
8.5.1 Model amendments
Based on the above, specific amendments which have been incorporated into the generic model
are described in Table 8.4.
This scenario aims to explore the effect of including an investment variable on performance
against strategy and the effect of increasing the desired reserves levels on the overall financial
sustainability of the model.
Variable Name Amendment Explanation
Federation investments Include a third variable
for federation fundrais-
ing investment with an
incremental allocation to
the investment fund of 20
percent, 40 percent, 60
percent and 80 percent in
Runs 1 through 4
Exploring the effect of investments on project per-
formance vs. performance against strategy over
time
Desired reserves levels at
a federation level
Varying the desired re-
serves levels from the ini-
tial 2 months (Run 1) to 4
months (Run 2) and then
down to 2 weeks (Run 3)
Exploring the effect of set reserves level based on
policy versus a risk-related reserve level on perfor-
mance against strategy
Table 8.4: Model amendments for financial sustainability
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Again, it is important to note that the degree to which variables are increased or decreased
are set fairly arbitrarily. It is the model behaviour that is of most interest and not the specific
values of constants as this is a hypothetical model.
8.5.2 Simulation Results
Effect of additional investment variable on funds available for allocation and pro-
gramme performance
The addition of an investment variable which diverts funds away from immediate allocation
towards investment in generating income in emerging markets, does show a relative increase
in the long run. Runs 1 to 4 show a progressive increase in the percentage of funds that is
diverted to emerging markets. Run 1 in grey has the smallest allocation to investment, 20
percent, whilst Run 4 in blue has the largest allocation, 80 percentage, for investment.
The graph in figure 8.12 shows that investments need to be fairly substantial to have an impact
on the total funds available for allocation as is evident by Run 4 in blue which shows the highest
percentage allocated to investments. Runs 1 to 3 have the same relative magintude until month
70 when Run 3 shows an increase. However, Run 4 shows an increased magnitute from the
beginning with an increased effect after month 70. This may be as a result of the fact that in
this model, less funds are raised in emerging markets and therefore more of an emphasis needs
to be placed on fundraising diversification.
Figure 8.12: Effect of investments on funds available for allocation
The resulting effect on the programme performance varies. The first graph in Figure 8.13 shows
the resulting effect on Programme X. Because there are less funds available for allocation in the
short and medium term, the relative allocation to Programme X is higher and this eventually
evens out over the longer term.
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However, this is not the case for Programme Y as is evident in the second graph in Figure
8.13. Since Programme Y is the larger programme, it mostly relies on earmarked and flexible
funds from mature markets. Because the programme requirements are large in the shorter
term a substantial investment would negatively affect this programme.
In both these cases though, a significant investment percentage of more than 60 percent is
required for any substantial change in behaviour of programme performance as is evident in
the behaviours of Run 4 (in blue).
Figure 8.13: Effect of investments on programme performance
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Effect of higher reserve requirements
The variations in reserve requirements have different effects when considering the federation vis-
a`-vis programmatic levels as is evident in Figure 8.14. Three simulation runs were conducted
with Run 1 maintaining the desired reserves level of 2 months. Run 2 shows an increased
reserve level of 4 months whilst Run three has a reduced reserve level of 0.5 months. The effect
of the variations in desired reserves level does have an impact on the federation deficit. As is
to be expected, with a higher reserve level of 4 months (Run 2), which is double the desired
reserve level of the generic model, the magnitude of the federation deficit increases and this
increase is exacerbated when there is a low overall income. This can be seen in Figure 8.14
between months 70 and 100, where the lower total income (in the top graph of Figure 8.14)
coincides with erratic deficits, especially for Run 2 with the additional 2 months requirement.
When considering Run 3, with a lower reserves requirement of 2 weeks, a quarter of the desired
reserves requirements in the generic model, the behaviour of the federation deficit is somewhat
smoothed, as is evident in the blue line in the bottom graph in Figure 8.14. There is remains
some volatility during months 70 to 100 when the total income is low, however it is attenuated.
It is important to note that, the second graph focuses on the deficit and any surplus funds
(beyond 2 months, 4 months and 2 weeks in Runs 1 to 3 respectively) are automatically directed
for reallocation so that there is not a build of funds in reserves. This is reflected in the bottom
graph in Figure 8.14 where the variations in magnitude are only towards the negative and are
do not fluctuate upwards beyond the respective upper bounds.
When comparing the federation deficit behaviour to the relative allocation to programmes in
the first graph in Figure 8.14, it is evident that the variations in reserve levels do not affect
the primary behaviour of total funds available for allocation. Although the federation deficit
is used to determine the amount of funds available for collective allocations to programme, the
influence is minimal compared to the predominant influence of the income generating variables.
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Figure 8.14: Effect of variation in reserve requirements on total funds available and deficit
levels
Reflection on Scenario 3:
Decisions pertaining to financial investments for INGOs, whether its in new fundraising mar-
kets, new technologies or infrastructure, are generally approached with caution. Earmarked
funds, either wholly or partially, are often restricted to pay for direct and/or indirect pro-
gramme costs which often exclude fundraising investments or operational efficiency (e.g. new
IT software) related expenditure. This means that INGOs that want to invest in different
funding markets, innovative approaches or technologies generally need to rely on flexible funds
to do so. Therefore management decisions aimed at reducing reserves or diverting flexible funds
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away from immediate programme requirements for investment in future returns, need to be
thoughtful and supported by rigorous analysis to minimise impact on financial sustainability
and the ability of the INGO to meet current programme requirements.
In both instances in this third scenario, the incorporation of an investment variable and the
variation of desired reserve levels requires a significant increase or presence (more than a 60
percent deviation from the generic model) in order to affect the overall behaviour of resource
allocation at a programmatic level and changes to performance against strategy. This is an im-
portant insight from an INGO management perspective because it demonstrates the significant
time and effort required to diversify income through investment in new markets. Not only does
it take some time for the returns on such investments to have an effect on the overall resource
allocation framework, it also shows that consolidating investment efforts, i.e. a focusing on
a more sizeable investment in fewer markets, may provide a better opportunity to influence
funding mixes and resource allocation policies.
Changing the desired reserves levels variables had minimal impact on the overall behaviour
of total funds available within the overall model as it is still primarily driven by the income
generating variables. With a reserves requirement of 2 weeks, the federation deficit is reduced
and smoothed whilst with a reserve requirements of 4 months, the magnitudes of the deficits
are reinforced, especially when income levels of low. INGO management should discuss the
pros and cons of the size of reserves being held at federation versus programme level in order
to maximise responsiveness whilst protecting themselves against volatile and/or decreasing
income levels.
In this scenario, Programmes X and Y also respond differently to the changes in investment
and reserve levels. As was described in Chapter 6, the characteristics of Programme X are
that of a smaller more volatile programme that struggles to draw in flexible funds away from
Programme Y to meet its requirements due to lower programme requirements and higher
volatility. On the other hand, Programme Y is a larger, more stable programme whose re-
quirements are largely met by earmarked funds and, because of its higher requirements, draws
additional flexible funds away from Programme X due to the way that the balancing mech-
anism is structured in this resource allocation model. The progressive increase in investment
percentages, depicted in Figure 8.13, is more detrimental to Programme Y which relies on
large amounts of flexible funds to meet its programme requirements.
Future studies could consider how to incorporate additional influences for the desired reserves
level, such as programme risk, as this may have different effects on the model.
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8.6 Summary
In this chapter three management scenarios were simulated, applying various model amend-
ments to the generic model described in Chapter 6. The management scenarios included
variations in income generation, adjustments to contribution percentages, variations in fund-
ing mixes and testing financial sustainability through the variation of desired reserves and
investment variables.
The amendments applied and the model results for each of these were discussed in detail as
well as their implications from an NGO management perspective. In the next chapter, these
results more holistically in relation to the resource allocation model’s success criteria that were
identified through stakeholder engagement and described in Chapter 6.
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Implication of Results
In the previous chapter, the different management scenarios and their individual results were
explored in detail. In this chapter, these results will be analysed and discussed in relation to
the model’s success factors that were identified in Chapter 6. Reflections on these results are
discussed as well as the implications and key messages for management in the INGO sector.
As mentioned previously, these results are illustrative of the power of applying system dynamics
modelling to resource allocation mechanisms in INGOs and the discussion below provides
examples of how these types of results could be interpreted in the INGO management context.
9.1 Discussion of scenario results
At the end of Chapter 6, three measures of success for this system dynamics model were
identified based on stakeholder feedback. These measures provide different lenses through
which to evaluate the model. The results of the scenarios and simulations are discussed in
relation to these measures of success below as well as drawing attention to some general insights.
Performance against strategy:
The model was able to explore which variables would be most affected by an increased volatility
in the income generating variables. The behaviour of performance against strategy is strongly
correlated with the behaviour of the income generating variables, especially that of income
being generated in mature markets. This behaviour is inherent in the system due to the over-
reliance on income generated in mature markets. Although in real-life situations performance
against strategy will be influenced by a number of other external uncertainties, the ability to
raise funds to meet programme requirements and having an organisation that is robust enough
to withstand sudden changes in the funding landscape, is well understood in the sector.
Diversifying income and including additional markets with their different behaviours would
lessen the overall strategy performance on one specific market. Although market volatility is
not a lever of change from a management perspective, mitigating the effect of its volatility
should be a priority for any resource allocation mechanism. This is in line with the initial
stakeholder feedback, and this model’s results could support an income diversification strategy
105
CHAPTER 9. IMPLICATION OF RESULTS
and increase buy-in from INGO decision makers. System dynamics could also provide some
interesting insights when considering how to diversify and help decision makers model the
longer term effects of such decisions on the sustainability of the organisation and its ability to
effectively deliver its programmes.
Although external uncertainties are not in the control of INGO decision makers, the parameters
involved in what to do with the funds once raised (especially flexible funds) are critical levers
of changes in resource allocation. The contribution percentage, is one such lever, determining
the minimum amount of funds that should be made available for collective allocation. In this
model, the contribution percentage has a delayed effect on performance against strategy. It
is a non-linear effect, with increased contribution percentages having an increased negative
effect on performance against strategy in the long term. This shows the necessity of having
an affordable contribution percentage that also allows existing fundraising countries to invest
in their own markets. This is just as important as having funds available to diversify into
new markets. Even although contribution percentages in this model were set fairly arbitrarily
and were independent variables, this is illustrative of a type of model structure that can be
further investigated, to assist INGO managers to gain a deeper understanding of the longer
term effects of their fundraising strategies.
It is also worth noting that the behaviour of the various fundraising variables changed over time
and therefore related strategies and parameters should be periodically reviewed and adjusted,
based on income trends and programme requirements to ensure that the percentage that is
applied is appropriate and delivers required results.
Financial sustainability:
From a financial sustainability perspective, there was a long term positive effect when the
investment variable was incorporated into the model. The short term effect of fundraising
investment resulted in reduced allocation to programmes but the magnitude was minimal and
was largely mitigated by the federation allocation level variable and federation reserve levels.
Although this is a general result, this does not necessarily validate the inclusion of such an
investment variable. Rather, it indicates that an appropriate investment function, contextu-
alised for a specific INGO, within the resource allocation model should be considered in order
to explore its long-term financial sustainability.
Further analysis of different programme funding combinations could uncover the more subtle
diversions of flexible funds however this was not explored in the simulation and could be
considered in future studies. The affordability of such an investment variable will depend upon
the relative size of flexible funds. There would be a trade-off between having funds available
in the moment for immediate programming compared with the “opportunity cost” of saving
for the future. Additional variables monitoring the potential negative effect of a reduction in
immediate funds and the affect on the INGO’s brand, fundraising capacity and/or “faith” in
the institution need to be considered in relation investment opportunities as well as size and
timing of the returns.
Changes to the desired reserves levels at a federation level do not impact the financial sus-
tainability of this model. Based on the various model simulations, this could mean that the
reserves policy is not an influential lever of change. It is important to note that desired reserves
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level in this simplified model was included a independent variable with no other variables influ-
encing it. This is most likely not the case in “real-life” INGO management contexts as reserve
levels are also influenced, for example, by volatility within programme countries which was not
featured in this model. Rather, reserve levels, in this case, are illustrative of a type of structure
that should be further investigated and expanded upon, based on different organisational and
external contexts, focussing on the influences and implications of different reserve policies and
its effect on financial sustainability.
Predictability of income for programmes:
The ability for any resource allocation mechanism to provide predictability in terms of income
for programmes is crucial. This model attempts to do this through the creation of a balancing
mechanism that uses the flexible funds allocation to offset programme deficits in relation to
earmarked funds.
The resulting behaviour of the balancing mechanism in this model illustrates the benefit of
considering the combined effect of these two types of funds. The generic model and the simu-
lations show how this mechanism “protects” overall programme performance by ensuring that
individual programme deficits do not become too burdensome with the allocation of flexible
funds.
It is important to note that the balancing mechanism in this model is an example of a simple
structure that can integrate these two types of funding into one framework. The application
of such a mechanism in the context of decentralised INGOs is much more complex as these
organisations deal with hundreds of programmes with different types of requirements and
their differentiation between earmarked vs. flexible funds is not straightforward nor broadly
applicable across all programmes. It is unlikely that any model will provide a silver bullet
to solve such management dilemmas which need to take into account very many quantitative
components overlaid with underlying power dynamics and conflicting objectives when it comes
to, often highly contested, resource allocation strategies. However, as system dynamics is an
iterative process, steps can be taken to consider piloting the integration of earmarked and
flexible funds into one allocation mechanism in certain areas and to learn and expand from
there.
Not only does this simple model depict the benefit of this type of a balancing mechanism,
it is also in line with the initial stakeholder feedback which articulates the importance of a
resource allocation mechanism to minimise negative impact on programme and mission related
activities. This would ultimately contribute to the predictability of programme income as any
sudden change in earmarked funds are offset with flexible funds, providing decision makers a
“grace” period to adjust and adapt the programme as required.
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9.2 Considerations for INGO management
The scenarios in Chapter 8 and the points mentioned earlier in this chapter are illustrative of
how management can reflect on such a system dynamics modelling exercise to gain insights
into the effects of different parameters on a resource allocation model. These should be further
interrogated to deepen the understanding of such a model in different management contexts
in order to inform any future policy development in this area.
This process allows for management to input different policy parameters to see how these
would affect the model and to simulate different challenging situations in order to test potential
solutions. This can also lead into more specific applications of resource allocation models which
would result in more specific conclusions based on individual organisational contexts. These
areas of future exploration are presented in the final Chapter.
The use of system dynamics to develop the simplified model is this study provides a starting
point for a more robust conversation about the relevance and power of such an approach
in the INGO management space. The system dynamics approach provides a transparent and
reliable process which can used to enhance stakeholder buy-in through model development and
analysis. It also increases the likelihood of the model’s results to be interpreted into actionable
recommendations and implemented within an organisation.
It is important to distinguish the difference between policy levers and external factors beyond
management control. For example, this process is not trying to understand and predict the
uncertainty of volatile markets or the changes in requirements, however incorporating even
some simple variables to introduce random uncertainty will provide much more insight into
how levers of change respond in such externalities.
The model and the three management scenarios discussed in Chapter 8 are only the tip of the
iceberg, so to speak. Each of the above scenarios can and should be further explored to address
specificities in the different management contexts. For example, diversification of fundraising,
and the different funding mixes can be dissected and modelled individually in more detail.
It is important to reiterate that the process followed in this study is not about creating an
optimal solution, rather, an illustration of how such a process could prove useful for strategic
planning and long term financial planning that usually takes place in an international NGO
every 5-8 years. The use of scenarios could be particularly beneficial in understanding the
effect of different strategic decisions on specific management processes, systems or structures.
Unfortunately, the stakeholders that were interviewed when this study was initiated were no
longer available for engagement and formal feedback on the results and findings. However,
should the opportunity have presented itself, the following four messages would have been
shared for discussion and reflection:
1. System dynamics can be a useful tool for international NGO management
processes. It has the ability to take into consideration many diverse views, provide
insights into the interactions and long term effects of policy decisions and its robustness
can increase confidence in decision making processes.
2. System dynamics modelling, applied resource allocation processes, has the
ability to develop quantitative and qualitative recommendations. The focus
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of this study has been on qualitative management decisions, considering the overall
behaviour of the model, in relation to, for example balancing funds between different
programmes. However, this generic model can be extended and adapted to represent a
specific “real life” allocation situation, upon which specific financial parameters can be
determined to optimise allocation.
3. This study revealed key policy levers that have an effect on resource allo-
cation. Policy parameters such as contribution percentages or different funding combi-
nations of flexible funds versus earmarked funds, when modelled in more detail, can be
used to inform fundraising and income diversification strategies.
4. The importance of modelling external influences. External factors such as pro-
gramme requirements and market volatility have significant influence over resource al-
location. The ability to bring these influences into a management model will allow for
a more informed strategy, both from a fundraising perspective as well as a programmes
perspective.
The next chapter continues to discuss the above in terms of recommendations for future studies
and the limitations within this study.
109
CHAPTER 9. IMPLICATION OF RESULTS
110
Chapter 10
Conclusion and Recommendations
10.1 Conclusions
The development issues plaguing the global community are increasingly complex and inter-
linked, not always adhering to geographical boundaries. Single-issue solutions are no longer
appropriate in our context. For example, fighting climate change takes combined economic,
political and environmental action. Although some of these issues do not discriminate, those
that are most deeply affected are people living in poverty, caught in a perpetual cycle that
requires a systemic change.
International NGOs have always played an important role in development. These organisations
are well positioned to be a catalyst for structural change, working with local communities,
governments, donors and private sector to achieve transformational change. However, the
management structures of such organisations are still evolving in order to better deal with
today’s complexity to effectively eradicate poverty, societal injustice and climate change.
This study is a good example of how a system dynamics modelling approach can help unpack
and model certain challenges that international NGOs face, in order to better deliver their
respective missions. This study focusses on one such management challenge, that of resource
allocation, the raising and distribution of funds. This particular management process was
chosen based on the author’s management experience in an international NGO - the inspiration
for this study.
A brief background to this study was provided in Chapter 2, including an introduction to
Non Government Organisations (NGOs) and the development context in the 21st century.
ActionAid International and Greenpeace International were introduced as two examples of
NGOs that have adopted decentralised structures, the NGO profile that is of interest in this
study.
In Chapter 3, the focus of the study was further refined, justifying the choice of resource
allocation as a relevant management process with “real world” challenges that can benefit
from a system dynamics approach. Chapter 4 included a literature review, which emphasised
the application of system dynamics in similar contexts and the potential complementarity of
operations research techniques in the modelling process.
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In Chapter 5, the stakeholder engagement process was explained and the resulting management
descriptions of resource allocation were summarised based on their feedback. This stakeholder
engagement process was a core component of the study as it identified a handful of “real world”
challenges in relation to resource allocation which formed the basis of the modelling process.
As identified in the literature review, operational research problem structuring methods were
applied to the management descriptions in order to define a more structured problem which was
then transformed into a system dynamics model. The problem structuring methods that were
used were soft systems methods and strategic options decision analysis, as these were deemed
the most appropriate given the level of stakeholder engagement and type of information that
was gathered. The resulting rich pictures, root definitions and cognitive maps were used to
inform the system dynamics modelling process.
Chapter 6 introduced system dynamics as the overall modelling approach and described in
detail the resource allocation model that was developed using Vensim PLE modelling software.
The model that was developed was not meant to be a full representative of resource allocation
in an international NGO. Rather the model attempted to take into account core common
components and provide a framework that could demonstrate how such a model could be
useful and provide insights for management decision making. The model was simplified to
include two types of income generating entities with two types of funds, earmarked and flexible,
which could be pooled and distributed to two programmes. One specific feature was the
inclusion of a balancing mechanism. This mechanism takes into account the extent to which
earmarked funds satisfied programme requirements and allocated flexible funds in response to
this. In reality, this is much more complex with many more entities raising funds and tens
of hundreds of programmes receiving funds. However as this is an initial exploration of this
type of analysis, the simplified model was deemed sufficient for the purposes of this study. The
model’s assumptions, structure and behaviour were validated in Chapter 7 after which a set of
management scenarios were simulated.
Chapter 8 describes the management scenarios that were simulated and the impact of these
different scenarios on the performance of the model. Three management scenarios were indi-
vidually overlaid on the generic model developed in Chapter 6. These scenarios explored the
extent to which the model was robust against external volatility, the effect of different funding
mixes on the model’s balancing mechanism and the effect of investment of performance against
strategy. The results were discussed and key insights summarised in Chapter 9. These simu-
lations revealed key levers for change for management. These levers included the contribution
percentages, the importance of diversification of income sources as well as the funding mix of
an organisation and the potential benefits of a balancing mechanism between different types
of funds. In addition, the model highlighted the influence of income generating countries over
the behaviour of the model. This further substantiates the importance of fundraising diversity.
Unfortunately, due to insufficient time and access to stakeholders towards the end of the study,
these results were not shared with stakeholders. However, from a research perspective, this
study can be used to introduce the concept and benefits of the system dynamics modelling
approach that takes into account feedback loops and multiple perspectives. It can help take
the “politicking” out of contentious decisions, such as resource allocation, and can help with
stakeholder buy in for different management strategies due to its robustness.
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10.2 Limitations of the study
There were two core limitations to this study:
1. Limited scope of study: The scope of this study was focussed on one aspect of
resource allocation within international NGOs with one specific organisational profile.
This meant that the generic model would need further extension it it were adopted by
any one organisation.
2. Limited access to stakeholders: Engagement with stakeholders waned towards the
end of the study. This meant that the research outcomes were not shared with stake-
holders and no direct action will be taken from a management perspective.
Effect of the limitations on the system dynamics model:
The system dynamics model is a fairly simple representation of a generic resource allocation
mechanism. Additional modelling would need to take place to solve specific problems and
identify optimal parameters. The management scenarios are simple amendments to the model,
more for illustrative purposes than for any other reason. This model is useful to show the
benefits of the application of such a modelling approach, however, a more in-depth model
would be needed for actual management decision making for a particular organisation.
Effect on the limitations model’s direct application:
The limited stakeholder engagement, in particular access to INGO management decision mak-
ers, means that it is unlikely that any specific actions in relation to resource allocation will
be taken. This study provides a glimpse of the power of system dynamics modelling, even
with this simple model. However, additional awareness and deeper understanding of system
dynamics would be required for NGO management to adopt such an approach. Investment
in a full system dynamics project may require additional resources and funds, which may not
be a management priority. However, as complexity is inherent in development issues this may
provide an incentive for NGOs to explore such approaches. This study could therefore prove
to be a useful reference point should any further projects be undertaken.
Finally, system dynamics modelling may be viewed as a complicated tool by management
teams. The concept and approach should be thoughtfully introduced to gain buy in so that
the specificity and precision it requires is acknowledged and understood to avoid potential
project abandonment.
10.3 Recommendations for future research
There is definitely scope for further exploration in the area of system dynamics and its ap-
plication to NGO management challenges. A major outcome of this study was to prove the
applicability and benefits of such a modelling technique in this area. It is hoped that this
will stimulate interest and engagement from NGO management to practically employ such ap-
proaches when dealing with complex systems and processes to improve outcomes and impact.
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What follows is a summary of suggestions for future research, some of which are particular to
the extension of this study whilst others may have a wider application.
• Explore other resource allocation related challenges that stakeholders presented in their
initial engagement:
– Model the conflicting objectives between offices in a federal structure as well as within
offices to explore the impact of “dual citizenship” (national versus international
agendas) and the impact on resource allocation
– The combination of earmarked income and flexible income into one model, as was
the case in this study, may add additional process complexity, consider the effect of
this integration on time and resources
– Although potentially sensitive, it would be very interesting to model the hidden
power dynamics in an international NGO with a federal structure and see how
these dynamics influence decision making processes, especially in relation to resource
allocation
• Further application of “soft” OR techniques in the international NGO management set-
ting:
– The incorporation of problem structuring methods in strategic change management
processes could prove beneficial, especially decision conferencing and scenario plan-
ning
– Cognitive maps (SODA analysis) could have multiple applications, especially during
exhaustive consultative processes where transparency is of the utmost importance
in terms of how decisions get made
• Extension of the system dynamics resource allocation model itself:
– Expand the number of fundraising and programme entities by incorporating addi-
tional level variables
– Consider the implication of programme entities also raising funds (i.e. not just
fundraising countries) and how this would impact the balancing mechanism. Should
these funds be used for individual country financial sustainability or pooled and
allocated by the federation?
– Incorporate additional influencing variables for the programme against strategy vari-
able
– Explore a different variable for reserves based on risk (both fundraising and pro-
gramme risk)
• Additional management scenarios to consider:
– Consider combining the management scenarios in this study to understand their
combined effect on resource allocation
– Consider a scenario which alters the decision rules in terms of allocation of funds,
beyond relative programme deficits, may include an override for “priority funds”
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– Check to see the extent to which additional diversification has an effect on the
behaviour of allocation and performance against strategy
• Stakeholder re-engagement:
– Using this study as a reference, engage with INGO management stakeholders to see
their reaction to such a model
– Attempt to raise funds from donors to do a more specific system dynamics project
within an INGO
– Look at other challenges in the INGO management space where soft OR and sys-
tem dynamics may help in terms of project prioritisation, strategic planning and
modelling the effect of specific advocacy vs. service delivery to see which is more
effective
– Consider how such a model can be set up so that management can simulate different
scenarios for their own organisations
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Ref	
No.
Variable	
Name
Variable	
Type
Algebraic	Equation Unit
Causes	(other	
variables	that	
influence	this	
variable)
Uses	(other	variables	that	
are	influenced	by	this	
variable)
Description
1 MuH Constant 500 GBP/month None Rate	Changes
Upper	limit	for	the	random	
uniform	function	that	
determines	the	rate	changes	
for	income	in	mature	markets
2 MuL Constant 100 GBP/month None Rate	Changes
Lower	limit	for	the	random	
uniform	equation	that	
determines	the	rate	changes	
for	income	in	mature	markets
3 Rate	Changes Auxiliary
IF	THEN	
ELSE(MODULO(Time,	12	)	
=	0,	(RANDOM	UNIFORM	
(MuL,	MuH,	0	)	-	
IncomeRateLevel	MM)	/	
TIME	STEP,	0	)
GBP/(Month*M
onth)
MuH,	MuL,	Time	Step	
and	Time
Income	Rate	Level	MM
The	random	uniform	function	
with	a	step	change	every	12	
months	which	generates	the	
mean	of	the	income	rate	in	
mature	markets
4 Income	Rate	
Level	MM
Level Rate	Changes		(with	an	
initial	value	of	200)
GBP/month Rate	Changes RateChanges,	Random	
Normal	Income	Rate	MM
As	above
5
Random	
Normal	
Income	Rate	
MM
Auxiliary
RANDOM	NORMAL	
(lower	limit	=	0,	upper	
limit	=	10000,	mean	=	
IncomeRateLevel	MM,	
sigma	=	10,	1	)
GBP/month
Income	Rate	Level	
MM
Total	Federation	Income	-	
Mature	Markets
The	random	normal	function	
that	generates	income	rates	in	
mature	markets
6
Total	
Federation	
Income	-	
Mature	
Markets
Auxiliary
Random	Normal	Income	
Rate	MM	*	Effect	of	
Performance	of	Strategy	
on	Total	Income
GBP/month
Random	Normal	
Income	Rate	MM,	
Effect	of	Performance	
of	Strategy	on	Total	
Income	
Earmarked	funds,	Funds	
Available	for	Global	
Allocation	-	Mature	
Markets
The	random	normal	income	
rate	for	mature	markets	
multiplied	by	the	delayed	
effect	of	performance	against	
strategy
7 MuH	0 Constant 100 GBP/month None Rate	Changes	0
Upper	limit	for	the	random	
uniform	function	that	
determines	the	rate	changes	
for	income	in	emerging	
markets
8 MuL	0 Constant 50 GBP/month None Rate	Changes	0
Lower	limit	for	the	random	
uniform	equation	that	
determines	the	rate	changes	
for	income	in	emerging	
markets
9
Rate	Changes	
0 Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	(MODULO	
(Time,	12)	=0,	(RANDOM	
UNIFORM	(MuL	0,	MuH	
0,	0)	-	IncomeRateLevel	
EM)	/	TIME	STEP,	0)
GBP/(Month*M
onth)
MuH	0,	MuL	0,	Time	
Step	and	Time Income	Rate	Level	EM
The	random	uniform	function	
with	a	step	change	every	12	
months	which	generates	the	
mean	of	the	income	rate	in	
emerging	markets
10 Income	Rate	
Level	EM
Level Rate	Changes	0		(with	an	
initial	value	of	100)
GBP/month Rate	Changes	0 RateChanges	0,	Random	
Normal	Income	Rate	EM
As	above
11
Random	
Normal	
Income	Rate	
EM
Auxiliary
RANDOM	NORMAL	
(lower	limit	=	0,	upper	
limit	=	10000,	mean	=	
IncomeRateLevel	MM,	
sigma	=	50,	1	)
GBP/month Income	Rate	Level	EM
Total	Federation	Income	-	
Emerging	Markets
The	random	normal	function	
that	generates	income	rates	in	
emerging	markets
12
Total	
Federation	
Income	-	
Emerging	
Markets
Auxiliary
Random	Normal	Income	
Rate	EM	*	Effect	of	
Performance	of	Strategy	
on	Total	Income
GBP/month
Random	Normal	
Income	Rate	MM,	
Effect	of	Performance	
of	Strategy	on	Total	
Income	
Earmarked	funds,	Funds	
Available	for	Global	
Allocation	-	Mature	
Markets
The	random	normal	income	
rate	for	emerging	markets	
multiplied	by	the	delayed	
effect	of	performance	against	
strategy
13
Proportional	
Splits	-	
Flexible	Funds	
Constant 0.6 Dimensionless None
Earmarked	funds,	Funds	
available	for	Global	
Allocation	-	Mature	
Markets
The	percentage	that	
determines	the	amount	of	
funds	available	for	collective	
allocation
14
Proportional	
Splits	-	
Earmarked	
Funds	
Constant 0.7 Dimensionless None
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	Y,	Funds	
Earmarked	for	Programme	
X
The	percentage	that	
determines	the	amount	of	
funds	that	have	been	
earmarked
15
Funds	
available	for	
Global	
Allocation	-	
Mature	
Markets
Auxiliary
Total	Federation	Income	
Mature	Markets	*	
Proportional	Splits	
Flexible	Funds
GBP/month
Proportional	Splits	-	
Flexible	Funds,	Total	
Federation	Income	-	
Mature	Markets
Desired	Reserves	for	
Programme	Allocation	,	
Inflows
Percentage	of	funds	available	
for	collective	allocation	from	
mature	markets
Ref	
No.
Variable	
Name
Variable	
Type
Algebraic	Equation Unit
Causes	(other	
variables	that	
influence	this	
variable)
Uses	(other	variables	that	
are	influenced	by	this	
variable)
Description
16 Earmarked	
Funds
Auxiliary
Total	Federation	Income	
Mature	Markets	*	(1	-	
Proportional	Splits	for	
Flexible	Funds)
GBP/month
Proportional	Splits	-	
Flexible	Funds,	Total	
Federation	Income	-	
Mature	Markets
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	Y,	Funds	
Earmarked	for	Programme	
X
Percentage	of	funds	available	
earmarked	from	mature	
markets
17
Funds	
Earmarked	for	
Programme	Y
Auxiliary
Earmarked	Funds	*	
Proportional	Splits	
Earmarked	Funds
GBP/month
Earmarked	Funds,	
Proportional	Splits	
Earmarked	Funds
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	-	
Programme	Y
Percentage	of	funds	available	
earmarked	for	Programme	Y
18
Funds	
Earmarked	for	
Programme	X
Auxiliary
Earmarked	Funds	*	(1	-	
Proportional	Splits	
Earmarked	Funds)
GBP/month
Earmarked	Funds,	
Proportional	Splits	
Earmarked	Funds
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	-	
Programme	X
Percentage	of	funds	available	
earmarked	for	Programme	X
19
Contribution	
Percentage	-	
Emerging	
Markets
Constant 0.3 Dimensionless None
Funds	available	for	Global	
Allocation	-	Emerging	
Markets
The	percentage	that	
determines	the	amount	of	
funds	available	for	collective	
allocation	from	emerging	
markets
20
Funds	
available	for	
Global	
Allocation	-	
Emerging	
Markets
Auxiliary
Total	Federation	Income	
Emerging	Markets	*	
Contribution	Percentage	
Emerging	Markets
GBP/month
Contribution	
Percentage	Emerging	
Markets,	Total	
Federation	Income	-	
Emerging	Markets
Inflows
Percentage	of	funds	available	
for	collective	allocation	from	
emerging	markets
21 Inflows Auxiliary
Funds	Available	for	
Global	Allocation	Mature	
Markets	+	Funds	
Available	for	Global	
Allocation	Emerging	
Markets
GBP/month
Funds	available	for	
Global	Allocation	-	
Emerging	Markets,	
Funds	available	for	
Global	Allocation	-	
Mature	Markets
Total	Funds	Available	(for	
collective	allocation)
Sum	of	funds	available	for	
collective	allocation	from	both	
mature	markets	and	emerging	
markets
22
Total	Funds	
Available	(for	
collective	
allocation)
Level Inflows	-	Outflows	(with	
an	initial	value	of	200)
GBP
Total	Funds	Available	
(for	collective	
allocation),	Inflows,	
Outflows
Federation	Deficit	(desired	
vs.	actual	reserves),	Total	
Fund	Rate	to	be	Allocated	
to	Programmes,	Outflows
The	actual	amount	of	GBP	
available	at	a	point	in	time	for	
collective	allocation
23 Outflows Auxiliary Actual	Allocation GBP/month
Total	Funds	Available	
(for	collective	
allocation)
Actual	Allocation
The	monthly	amount	that	is	
actually	allocated	between	
Programme	X	and	Programme	
Y
24 Actual	
Allocation
Auxiliary
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	X	+	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Collective	
Funds	to	Programme	Y
GBP/month
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	X
Outflows
The	monthly	amount	that	is	
actually	allocated	between	
Programme	X	and	Programme	
Y
25
No.	of	Months	
Required	for	
Reserves
Constant 2 Month None Desired	Reserves	for	
Programme	Allocation
Number	of	months	of	required	
reserves	as	per	policy
26
Desired	
Reserves	for	
Programme	
Allocation
Auxiliary
Funds	Available	for	
Global	Allocation	Mature	
Markets	*	No.	of	Months	
Required	for	Reserves
GBP
No.	of	Months	
Required	for	
Reserves,	Funds	
available	for	Global	
Allocation	Mature	
Markets
Federation	Deficit	(desired	
vs.	actual	reserves)
The	desired	reserves	level	
based	on	funds	available	for	
global	allocation	of	mature	
markets	(as	this	is	the	more	
stable	income	stream)
27
Federation	
Deficit	
(desired	vs.	
actual	
reserves)
Auxiliary
100	*	(Total	Funds	
Available	(for	collective	
allocation)	-	Desired	
Reserves	for	Programme	
Allocation)	/	Total	Funds	
Available	(for	collective	
allocation)
Dimensionless
Desired	Reserves	for	
Programme	
Allocation,	Total	
Funds	Available	(for	
collective	allocation)
Deficit	Multiplier
The	extent	to	which	funds	
available	meet	desired	
reserves	expressed	as	a	
proportion	which	would	
indicate	either	a	surplus	or	a	
deficit	at	the	federation	level
28
Deficit	
Multiplier
Auxiliary	
with	Look	
Up
Federation	Deficit	
(desired	vs.	actual	
reserves)
Dimensionless
Federation	Deficit	
(desired	vs.	actual	
reserves)
Proportion	Used	per	Month
The	mapping	of	the	federation	
deficit	onto	a	look	up	table	to	
establish	the	resulting	
behaviour	(the	closer	the	
deficit	or	is	to	zero	the	more	
subtle	the	effect	on	the	model,	
and	the	more	extreme	the	
deficit	or	surplus	the	
behaviour	exacerbates)
Ref	
No.
Variable	
Name
Variable	
Type
Algebraic	Equation Unit
Causes	(other	
variables	that	
influence	this	
variable)
Uses	(other	variables	that	
are	influenced	by	this	
variable)
Description
29 Standard	
Proportion
Constant 0.5 1/Month None Proportion	Used	per	Month Standard	proportion	
30
Proportion	
Used	per	
Month
Auxiliary Deficit	Multiplier	*	
Standard	Proportion
1/Month Deficit	Multiplier,	
Standard	Proportion
Total	Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	Programmes
Determines	the	monthly	
proportion	of	funds	that	can	
be	used	based	on	the	existing	
federation	deficit
31
Total	Fund	
Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	
Programmes
Auxiliary
Proportion	Used	per	
Month	*	Total	Funds	
Available	(for	collective	
allocation)
GBP/month
Proportion	Used	per	
Month,	Total	Funds	
Available	(for	
collective	allocation)
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Collective	
Funds	to	Programme	X,	
Alpha	Max,	Alpha	Min,	
Sufficient	funds	for	
Allocation	to	Programme	X	
and	Programme	Y
Determines	the	rate	of	total	
funds	available	for	collective	
allocation	to	either	
Programme	X	or	Programme	Y
32
Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Collective	
Funds	to	
Programme	Y
Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	(Sufficient	
funds	for	Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y	=	1,	
Programme	Y	Deficit,	
Total	Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	Programmes	
*	(1	-	Alpha	(a))	)
GBP/month
Alpha	(a),	Programme	
Y	Deficit,	Total	Fund	
Rate	to	be	Allocated	
to	Programmes,	
Sufficient	funds	for	
Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y
Actual	Allocation,	Inflows	Y
Determines	rate	of	allocation	
of	collective	funds	to	
Programme	Y	based	on	relative	
proportion	of	the	deficit	of	
funds	between	Programme	Y	
and	Programme	X
33
Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Collective	
Funds	to	
Programme	X
Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	(Sufficient	
funds	for	Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y	=	1,	
Programme	X	Deficit,	
Total	Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	Programmes	
*	Alpha	(a))
GBP/month
Alpha	(a),	Programme	
X	Deficit,	Total	Fund	
Rate	to	be	Allocated	
to	Programmes,	
Sufficient	funds	for	
Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y
Actual	Allocation,	Inflows	X
Determines	rate	of	allocation	
of	collective	funds	to	
Programme	X	based	on	
relative	proportion	of	the	
deficit	of	funds	between	
Programme	Y	and	Programme	
X
34 Alpha	(a)
Auxiliary	
with	Look	
Up
Alpha	Min	+	(Alpha	(hat)	
*	(Alpha	Max	-	Alpha	
Min))
Dimensionless
Alpha	(hat),	Alpha	
Max,	Alpha	Min
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Collective	
Funds	to	Programme	X
Determines	the	proportion	of	
collective	funds	that	should	be	
allocated	between	Programme	
Y	and	Programme	X
35 Rho	(p) Auxiliary
Programme	X	Deficit	/	
(Programme	X	Deficit	+	
Programme	Y	Deficit)
Dimensionless
Programme	Y	Deficit,	
Programme	X	Deficit Alpha	(hat)
Proportion	of	Programme	X	
deficit	in	relation	to	total	
programmatic	deficit	(of	both	
Programme	Y	and	Programme	
X)
36 Alpha	(hat) Auxiliary Rho	(p) Dimensionless Rho	(p)
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Collective	
Funds	to	Programme	X
As	above
37 Alpha	Max Auxiliary
MIN	(Total	Fund	Rate	to	
be	Allocated	to	
Programme's,	
Programme	X	
Requirements	)	/	Total	
Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	Programmes
Dimensionless
Programme	X	
Requirements,	Total	
Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	
Programmes
Alpha	(a)
Determines	the	upper	limit	for	
the	proportion	of	allocation	of	
collective	funds	to	Programme	
X	and	Programme	Y
38 Alpha	Min Auxiliary
MIN	(Total	Fund	Rate	to	
be	Allocated	to	
Programmes,	
Programme	Y	
Requirements	)	/	Total	
Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	Programmes
Dimensionless
Programme	Y	
Requirements,	Total	
Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	
Programmes
Alpha	(a)
Determines	the	lower	limit	for	
the	proportion	of	allocation	of	
collective	funds	to	Programme	
X	and	Programme	Y
39 Programme	Y	
Requirements
Auxiliary
RANDOM	NORMAL	
(lower	limit	=	1,	upper	
limit	=	2000,	mean	=	
1000,	sigma	=	10,	1)
GBP/month None Alpha	Min,	Outflows	Y,	
Programme	Y	Deficit
Random	normal	function	
generates	the	GBP	
requirements	per	month	for	
Programme	Y	
Ref	
No.
Variable	
Name
Variable	
Type
Algebraic	Equation Unit
Causes	(other	
variables	that	
influence	this	
variable)
Uses	(other	variables	that	
are	influenced	by	this	
variable)
Description
40 Programme	X	
Requirements
Auxiliary
RANDOM	NORMAL	
(lower	limit	=	1,	upper	
limit	=	1000,	mean	=	150,	
sigma	=	100,	1)
GBP/month None Alpha	Max,	Outflows	X,	
Programme	X	Deficit
Random	normal	function	
generates	the	GBP	
requirements	per	month	for	
Programme	X
41 Programme	Y	
Deficit
Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	
(Programme	Y	
Requirements	-	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Earmarked	
Funds	Programme	Y	>=0	,	
Programme	Y	
Requirements
-	Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	
Programme	Y,	0)
GBP/month
Programme	Y	
Requirements,	Rate	
of	Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	-	
Programme	Y
Rho	(p),	Rate	of	Allocation	
of	Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Sufficient	
funds	for	Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y
Determines	Programme	Y	
deficit	based	on	the	difference	
between	Programme	Y	
requirements	and	funds	
earmarked	funds	for	
Programme	Y
42
Programme	X	
Deficit Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	
(Programme	X	
Requirements	-	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Earmarked	
Funds	Programme	X	>=0	
,	Programme	X	
Requirements	-	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Earmarked	
Funds	Programme	X,	0)
GBP/month
Programme	X	
Requirements,	Rate	
of	Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	-	
Programme	X
Rho	(p),	Rate	of	Allocation	
of	Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	X,	Sufficient	
funds	for	Allocation	to	
Programme	X	and	
Programme	Y
Determines	Programme	X	
deficit	based	on	the	difference	
between	Programme	X	
requirements	and	funds	
earmarked	funds	for	
Programme	X
43
Sufficient	
funds	for	
Allocation	to	
Programme	X	
and	
Programme	Y
Auxiliary
IF	THEN	ELSE	
(Programme	X	Deficit	+	
Programme	Y	Deficit	<=	
Total	Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	
Programmes,	1,	0)
Dimensionless
Programme	Y	Deficit,	
Programme	X	Deficit,	
Total	Fund	Rate	to	be	
Allocated	to	
Programmes
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Collective	
Funds	to	Programme	X
A	decision	rule	that	returns	1	
of	there	are	sufficient	funds	to	
meet	both	Programme	Y	and	
Programme	X	requirements	or	
0	if	the	funds	are	insufficient
44
Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Earmarked	
Funds	-	
Programme	Y
Auxiliary
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	Y GBP/month
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	Y
Inflows	Y,	Programme	Y	
Deficit
Determines	the	rate	of	funds	
available	earmarked	for	
Programme	Y	per	month
45
Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Earmarked	
Funds	-	
Programme	X
Auxiliary
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	X GBP/month
Funds	Earmarked	for	
Programme	X
Inflows	X,	Programme	X	
Deficit
Determines	the	rate	of	funds	
available	earmarked	for	
Programme	X	per	month
46 Inflows	Y Auxiliary
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y	+	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Earmarked	
Funds	Programme	Y
GBP/month
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	Y,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	
Programme	Y
Cumulative	Funds	Available	
Programme	Y
Sum	of	funds	available	for	
collective	allocation	for	
Programme	Y	and	earmarked	
funds	for	Programme	Y
47
Cumulative	
Funds	
Available	
Programme	Y
Level
Inflows	Y	-	Outflows	Y	
(with	an	initial	value	of	
100)
GBP	
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	
Y,	Inflows	Y,	Outflows	
Y
Programme	Y	Reserves
The	actual	amount	of	GBP	
available	at	a	point	in	time	for	
allocation	to	Programme	Y
48 Outflows	Y Auxiliary
Programme	Y	
Requirements GBP/month
Programme	Y	
Requirements
Cumulative	Funds	Available	
Programme	Y,	Programme	
Y	Reserves
The	monthly	amount	that	is	
actually	allocated	to	
Programme	Y
49
Programme	Y	
Reserves Auxiliary
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	Y	/	
Outflows	Y
Month
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	
Y,	Outflows	Y
Performance	of	Programme	
Y
The	actual	number	of	months	
reserve	for	Programme	Y
50
Performance	
of	Programme	
Y
Auxiliary
(Programme	Y	Reserves	-		
Desired	Programme	
Reserves)	/	(MAX	
(Desired	Programme	
Reserves,	Programme	Y	
Reserves))
Dimensionless
Desired	Programme	
Reserves,	Programme	
Y	Reserves
Performance	against	
Strategy
The	extent	to	which	funds	
available	for	Programme	Y	
meet	the	programme's	
requirements.	
51
Desired	
Programme	
Reserves
Constant 2 Month None
Performance	of	Programme	
Y,	Performance	of	
Programme	X
Number	of	months	of	required	
reserves	for	each	Programme	
as	per	policy
Ref	
No.
Variable	
Name
Variable	
Type
Algebraic	Equation Unit
Causes	(other	
variables	that	
influence	this	
variable)
Uses	(other	variables	that	
are	influenced	by	this	
variable)
Description
52 Inflows	X Auxiliary
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	X	+	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	Earmarked	
Funds	Programme	X
GBP/month
Rate	of	Allocation	of	
Collective	Funds	to	
Programme	X,	Rate	of	
Allocation	of	
Earmarked	Funds	
Programme	X
Cumulative	Funds	Available	
Programme	X
Sum	of	funds	available	for	
collective	allocation	for	
Programme	X	and	earmarked	
funds	for	Programme	X
53
Cumulative	
Funds	
Available	
Programme	X
Level
Inflows	X	-	Outflows	X	
(with	an	initial	value	of	
100)
GBP	
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	
X,	Inflows	X,	Outflows	
X
Programme	X	Reserves
The	actual	amount	of	GBP	
available	at	a	point	in	time	for	
allocation	to	Programme	X
54 Outflows	X Auxiliary
Programme	X	
Requirements GBP/month
Programme	X	
Requirements
Cumulative	Funds	Available	
Programme	X,	Programme	
X	Reserves
The	monthly	amount	that	is	
actually	allocated	to	
Programme	X
55
Programme	X	
Reserves Auxiliary
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	X	/	
Outflows	X
Month
Cumulative	Funds	
Available	Programme	
X,	Outflows	X
Performance	of	Programme	
X
The	actual	number	of	months	
reserve	for	Programme	X
56
Performance	
of	Programme	
X
Auxiliary
(Programme	X	Reserves	-		
Desired	Programme	
Reserves)	/	(MAX	
(Desired	Programme	
Reserves,	Programme	X	
Reserves))
Dimensionless
Desired	Programme	
Reserves,	Programme	
X	Reserves
Performance	against	
Strategy
The	extent	to	which	funds	
available	for	Programme	X	
meet	the	programme's	
requirements.	
57
Performance	
against	
Strategy
Auxiliary
MIN(	Performance	of	
Programme	X	,	
Performance	of	
Programme	Y	)
Dimensionless
Performance	of	
Programme	Y,	
Performance	of	
Programme	X
Effect	of	Performance	of	
Strategy	on	Total	Income
Overall	performance	against	
strategy	is	equated	to	the	
lower	programmatic	
performance	between	
Programme	X	and	Programme	
Y
58 Delay	Time Constant 12 Month None	 Effect	of	Performance	of	
Strategy	on	Total	Income
The	number	of	months	delay	
that	the	effect	of	the	
performance	of	strategy	has	
on	total	income
59
Effect	of	
Performance	
of	Strategy	on	
Total	Income
Auxiliary	
with	Look	
Up
DELAY1I	(Performance	
against	Strategy,	Delay	
Time,	0)
Dimensionless
Delay	Time,	
Performance	against	
Strategy
Total	Federation	Income	-	
Mature	Markets,	Total	
Federation	Income	-	
Emerging	Markets
Maps	the	effect	of	
performance	against	strategy	
onto	federation	income	in	
both	mature	and	emerging	
markets
